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1 K.U. v Finland, no. 2872/02, 2 December 2008.
2 I. v Finland, no. 20511/03, 17 July 2008.
3 Where the phrase ‘communication or
communications data’ is used, it refers to data that
is capable of identifying the sender and recipient
of the communication.
Introduction
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has
developed a system of human rights and fundamental
rights and freedoms on the basis of the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Rights and Freedoms (Convention). The
court’s case law has opened new dimensions in the
material definition of private life as a right to integrity
and identity, and in the ways in which private life has to
be protected by the domestic legal orders of the
Contracting States of the European Convention. The
ECHR case law should be compulsory reading for all
lawyers specializing in ICT law (information and
communication technology law or computer law) and
law on electronic evidence. The judgments of the ECHR
do not, however, always enjoy the attention they
deserve by the specialised lawyers working in fields
other than human rights law itself, and certainly not the
attention of ITC experts and systems developers.
The ECHR has, in the 2008 judgment of the case of
K.U. v Finland, further developed its case law
concerning the protection of private life – the right to
privacy – and the criminal law protection that the
Contracting States to the European Convention should
give to the right to private life.1 K.U. v Finland is the
second judgment during 2008 in applications brought
against Finland concerning the positive obligations of
the Contracting States to provide for the efficient and
effective protection for the right to privacy, and to
assure such protection in the context of information and
communication systems. The first of these cases, the
case of I. v Finland of 17 July 2008, concerns the security
arrangements on the access to records of sensitive and
confidential health data kept by a public hospital.2 In
this judgment, the ECHR stated that it is necessary to
have such information security measures in place that
provide practical and effective protection to exclude the
possibility of unauthorized access from taking place in
accordance with the provisions of article 8 of the
European Convention of Human Rights. The second of
these cases, the case of K.U. v Finland, concerns the use
of criminal law in the protection of privacy. The ECHR
found that the positive obligations of the Contracting
States to ensure the protection of private life entailed an
obligation to provide law enforcement agencies with the
ability to obtain access to dynamic IP addresses and
communication data3 in order to identify a private
person who has violated another individual’s right to
private life.
The ECHR judgment in K.U. v Finland contributes to
the definition of the balance between the freedom and
confidentiality of communications and anonymity over
the internet, and the requirements of privacy and
limitations of anonymity and confidentiality of
communications. This judgment deserves wide
international attention, even though it is not a Grand
Chamber decision. It opens a new dimension in the case
law, and takes position on an issue of interpretation felt
particularly important by the court itself. This judgment
is also noteworthy in respect of further developments of
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the obligations of legislators to follow societal and
technical developments and amend legislation so as to
provide an effective protection, and also to provide for
electronic evidence for investigations of alleged
violations.
If the judgment in the case of K.U. v Finland is set in
the wider perspective of the ECHR case law, these
requirements seem to go beyond criminal law. The court
requires the provisions of a privacy friendly legal,
information and communications infrastructure and
architecture, which also provides for effective remedies.
According to the judgment, an effective and efficient
protection of private life and deterrence against
violations of private life must be included in the
information and communication architecture. The
government and the legislator are required to ensure
that legislation is up-to-date, and also to ensure that
legislation is applicable and effectively applied in
practice.
Factual background and the judgment
Material events and legal procedures in Finland 
The events in the case of K.U. v Finland began on 15
March 1999. On this day, an unknown person placed an
advertisement on a dating site on the internet in the
name of a 12 year old boy, K.U. The advertisement
mentioned the age and year of birth of the boy. It also
gave a detailed description of his physical
characteristics and a link to his website. This included
his picture, and his telephone number, which was
correct save for one digit. It was claimed in the
advertisement that he was looking for an intimate
relationship with a boy of his age or older ‘to show him
the way’. K.U. became aware of the advertisement when
he received an e-mail from a man who proposed to meet
him and ‘to see what you want’. K.U.’s father requested
the police to identify the person who placed the
advertisement on the dating site in order to prefer
criminal charges. The internet service provider refused
to divulge the identity of the holder of the dynamic IP
address in question, regarding itself bound by the
confidentiality of communications as defined by law.
The police requested the District Court to issue an
order to divulge the dynamic IP address and the identity
of the holder of the IP address on the basis of the
Criminal Investigations Act, Act no. 449/1987
(Esitutkintalaki 449/1987). On 19 January 2001, the
District Court refused the order in the absence of an
explicit legal provision authorising the court to order a
service provider to disclose telecommunications data.
According to the decision of the District Court, the
Finnish legislation in force at the time allowed the police
the right to obtain telecommunication data only in
certain offences. The placing of the advertisement in
this case would be categorised as a calumny under the
Penal Code. The law in force in Finland at the material
time did not refer to calumny in the list of offences in
which the police had the right to obtain
telecommunications data. On 14 March 2001, the Court
of Appeal upheld the decision of the District Court. On
31 August 2001, the Supreme Court refused to leave
appeal. The prosecutor in charge of the case decided,
on 2 April 2001, that the managing director of the
internet service provider could not be charged for the
violation of the Personal Data Act no 523/1999 because
the alleged offence was time-barred.4
The application in the European Court of Human Rights 
On 1 January 2002, K.U. lodged an application in the
European Court of Human Rights against Finland,
alleging that the State had failed in its positive
obligations to protect the applicant’s right to respect for
his private life under article 8 of the Convention.
The European Court of Human Rights exercises the
4 Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and
of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection
of individuals with regard to the processing of
personal data and on the free movement of such
data, OJ L281, 23.11.95, p. 31-50 was implemented
in Finland by Personal Data Act no 523/1999
(Henkilötietolaki 22.4.1999/523). The Personal
Data Act is the general data protection statute in
Finnish law and it gives effect to the provisions in
section 10 of the Constitution of Finland, which
requires that protection for personal data shall be
provided by law.
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highest and final instance jurisdiction on the
interpretation of the European Convention on Human
Rights. The ECHR assesses whether the law of the
Contracting States to the Convention provides
guarantees for human rights and fundamental freedoms
as they are guaranteed in the Convention. The court
focuses on the functioning of the legal order of Member
States from the point of view of the protection of human
rights.5
The ECHR, because it is the final court in terms of
protection of the human rights and fundamental rights
and freedoms, has an excessive case load. This
explains, partly, the time it takes for the court to hear a
case. In the case of K.U., the judgment was delivered six
years after the application and over eight years after the
material events took place. For the development of
precedents in the context of the internet and ICT, six
years is a very long time. The relevant legislation in the
Contracting States has often changed in the meantime.
This is also the situation in the case of K.U. However,
the reasoning of the ECHR and the requirements it set
out are valid and topical.
At the time of the events of the case, section 8 of the
Finnish Constitution Act provided that everyone’s right
to private life is guaranteed. Paragraph 2 of section 8 of
the Constitution Act provided for the inviolability of
correspondence, telephone calls and other forms of
confidential communications. The protection of Privacy
and Data Security in Telecommunications Act (Act no
565/1999), which was repealed on 1 September 2004,
provided for the protection of the confidentiality of data
in relation to transmissions to a particular subscriber
connection. Pursuant to section 18 of the Act, the police
had the right to obtain data relating to the identity of a
person for the purpose of investigating an offence
referred to in listed sections of the Penal Code. Calumny
was not in the list of the crimes referred to in this Act.
The investigations by the police are covered by the
Criminal Investigations Act (Act no. 449/1987) and
Coercive Measures Act (Act no. 450/1987). At the time of
the events of the case, chapter 5a, section 3 of the
Coercive Measures Act provided that the police could,
upon authorisation of a court, monitor the
telecommunications connection in the suspect’s
possession or otherwise presumed to be in his use, if
the information obtained by monitoring could be
assumed to be very important for the investigation, and
the alleged offence was punishable by imprisonment of
not less than four months, or the suspected offence is
an offence against a computer system using a terminal
device, or a narcotics offence.
Telecommunications monitoring was, thus, allowed in
some specific computer related crimes or in serious
crimes. At the time of the events, calumny was defined
in chapter 27, section 3a of the Penal Code (the
provision was inserted to the Penal Code by Act no.
908/1974). A person convicted of committing an act of
calumny against another person by a derogatory
statement or by another degrading act faced a
maximum term of three months imprisonment if
convicted. The maximum sentence was four months if
the calumny was committed in public or in print or
disseminated in writing. Further provisions at that time
in relation to chapter 27, section 3a were introduced in
1974 to the Finnish Penal Code as a reaction to the
infringement of privacy by the mass media. Other
offences against the honour of a person and defamation
also had fines as minimum penalty and were not listed
as offences in which the monitoring of
telecommunications would have been possible.
The processing and publishing of sensitive
information concerning sexual behaviour on an internet
server without the person’s consent was criminalised at
the material time as a data protection offence in section
43 of the Personal Files Act (Henkilörekisterilaki
471/1987, criminal provisions were amended by act no
630/1995) and in chapter 38, section 9 of the Penal
Code or as data protection violation in section 44 of the
Personal Files Act. The publishing of information
concerning sexual behaviour could also have caused
5 K.U. v Finland, 44.
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liability and a claim for damages in accordance with the
provisions of the Personal Files Act. At the material time
of the events of the case, the legal position in Finland
was that the criminal law did not provide very strong
penalties or provide for coercive investigation methods
in offences related to moral integrity or other immaterial
values. This situation had also been criticized in the
legal literature; the criminal law seemed to provide
stronger and more comprehensive protection in classic
crimes against life and physical integrity and property
than in offences against moral integrity or other
intangible values.
Since the events of the case, the Finnish law has been
changed in many respects. The Constitutional provisions
on human rights are substantially the same. The
protection of private life is found in section 10 of the
Constitution. Freedom of expression, which included a
right to receive and send communications, is
guaranteed in section 12 of the Constitution. The most
significant change is that the Exercise of the Freedom of
Expression in Mass Media Act no 460/2003 (Laki
sananvapauden käyttämisestä joukkoviestinnässä
460/2003), which entered into force on 1 January 2004.
This new act is widely applicable to internet activities.
This act also provides access to communications data if
the content of a message is of such kind that providing
it to the public is a criminal offence. The provisions of
section 17 of the Act sets out the conditions of the
release of information relating to the identity of the
person: a court may order the release of information
required to identify a sender of a network message
provided that there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the contents of the message are such that
providing it to the public is a criminal offence. The Act
also requires the service provider to keep and record
data identifying the sender and the contents of the
messages for a certain time in order to ensure the
practical implementation of both criminal and civil
liability for the contents of the messages.
The general Act on the protection of personal data,
the Personal Data Act, provides that a service provider is
under a criminal liability to verify the identity of the
sender before publishing an announcement on the
web.6 The Coercive Measures Act has been amended by
Act no. 646/2003 concerning the definition and
conditions of telecommunications surveillance.
Disclosure of confidential information about the parties
to telecommunications and communications data is only
possible in respect of listed serious offences. These are
generally offences for which the maximum penalty is at
least four years of imprisonment, and certain other
crimes including crimes against the functioning of
computer systems. Defamation, calumny or the data
protection offence in the form of failure of the network
service provider to identify the sender of the message in
accordance with the provisions of Personal Data Act do
not belong to the offences in which a court may
authorise surveillance. The Penal Code has been
reformed concerning offences against confidentiality of
communications and privacy. A new chapter 24 contains
offences against privacy. Section 17 in the Exercise of
Freedom of Expression in Mass Media Act remains the
only provision in Finnish law of the disclosure of
dynamic IP addresses or other communications data in
cases of unauthorised distribution of information
violating individual privacy. The sufficiency of these
changes was also discussed shortly by the ECHR, since
the Finnish government presented the argument that
later legislative changes had rectified some of the
alleged defects in the legal framework.
The government’s arguments
The response of the Finnish government to the
application in the case of K.U. v Finland rested on two
essential arguments. First, a private individual interfered
with the applicant’s private life; it was not caused by a
public authority. Second, the service provider of the
dating service had an obligation to verify the identity of
the person who had placed the advertisement. This duty
was reinforced by provisions in the Penal Code and
Personal Data Act, which made the failure to identify a
person a criminal offence, and also established civil
damages for the failure to respect the provisions on
identity. According to the government, these provisions
had sufficient deterrent effect and the State had, thus,
taken measures required by the Convention to ensure
the protection of private life. The government referred to
the ECHR judgment in the case of X and Y v
Netherlands, according to which the liability in damages
could provide a sufficient deterrent effect.7
The government also drew attention to the fact that
the criminal investigation in the case of K.U. was not
successful because of the legislation, whose aim was to
protect the freedom of expression and the right to
anonymous expression that the fundamental right and
freedom entails. The extensive protection to the
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6 Section 48 of the Personal Data Act.
7 ECHR judgment in the case of X and Y v the
Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A
no 91. 
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anonymity of internet messaging, which even covered
messages interfering with another person’s right to
private life, was a mere side effect of the broad and
vague concept of message. This definition of the
concept of message made it, according to the
government, impossible to exclude messages
interfering with private life from other messages.
The government argued that the legislation
concerning the protection of private life should be
assessed in the light of the social context of the time,
and that at the material time of the events the rapid
increase on the use of the internet was only just
beginning. Legislative arrangements undertaken after
the material events of the case have, according to the
government’s argument, further strengthened the
protection of private life in respect of the freedom of
expression. Legislation thus reflects the legislator’s
reaction to social development and the need for
protection.
The judgment of the court 
The ECHR cited and reviewed the relevant Finnish
legislation and took note of the legal changes since the
events of the case. The court went on to cite relevant
international materials, and emphasised the Council of
Europe Recommendation No R (95) concerning criminal
procedure law connected with information technology
and the Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime of
23 November 2004. The court also reviewed the some of
the contents of the European Union Directive
2006/24/EC amending Directive 2002/58/EC, the
Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications,
and the EC Electronic Communications Data Retention
Directive 2006/24/EC which requires the Member
States of the European Union to ensure, amongst other
things, that data are available for the purpose of
investigation, detection and the prosecution of serious
crime in relation to the use of the internet and e-mail
communications, such as the address of the subscriber
or the registered user to whom an internet Protocol (IP)
address is allocated at the time of communication.8
The ECHR took particular note of the fact that in the
case of K.U., a minor was the subject of an
advertisement of a sexual nature. This created a
stronger positive obligation on the legislator and other
public authorities of a Contracting State to protect
fundamental rights and freedoms, even in the
relationships between private individuals. The court
also pointed out that even though the material events of
the case were qualified as calumny under the Finnish
law, the case was essentially about the right to private
life. The court preferred to assess the events and
protection provided by the domestic legal order from
that perspective. The situation was aggravated by the
vulnerability caused by the relatively young age of K.U.
at the time.9 According to the court, children and other
vulnerable individuals are entitled to State protection, in
the form of an effective deterrence, from grave types of
interference with essential aspects of their private life.10
The court reiterated its earlier case law that article 8
of the Convention does not only compel the State to
abstain from arbitrary interference by public authorities
to private life, but creates positive obligations to ensure
the protection of private life.11 These positive obligations
may involve the adoption of measures designed to
secure the respect for private life in the sphere of
relations of individuals between themselves.12
The positive obligations to secure respect for private
life extend to the horizontal relations between
individuals, and are not only applicable in the vertical
relations between individuals and public authorities.
The court also recalled its earlier case law, according to
which in cases where fundamental values and essential
aspects of private life are at stake, efficient criminal law
provisions are required.13
The court rejected the Finnish government’s argument
that the mere possibility of a criminal prosecution and
the general prevention this possibility was sufficient
protection of the right to private life. According to the
court, the positive obligations may extend to the
effectiveness of a criminal investigation.14 The court
considered that in the case of K.U. v Finland, a practical
and effective protection required that effective steps be
taken to identify and prosecute the perpetrator. In the
case of K.U., such protection was not afforded, and
8 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector
(Directive on privacy and electronic
communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47;
Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
retention of data generated or processed in
connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public
communications networks and amending Directive
2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 54–63.
9 K.U. v Finland, 41.
10 K.U. v Finland, 46; the ECHR referred, in respect to
this argument, to its judgment on Stubbings and
Others v the United Kingdom, 22 October 1996, §
64, Reports 1996-IV.
11 K.U. v Finland, 42. ECHR cited its judgment on the
case of Airey v Ireland, judgment of 9 October
1979, Series A no 32, § 32.
12 K.U. v Finland, 43.
13 K. U. v Finland, 43; the ECHR cited its judgments
on the case of X and Y v the Netherlands, judgment
of 26 March 1985, Series A no 91, §§ 23-24 and 27,
and the case of August v United Kingdom (dec.),
no 36505/02, 21 January 2003 and M.C. v Bulgaria,
no 39272/98, § 150, ECHR 2003-XII.
14 K.U. v Finland, 46. The court referred to its earlier
case law to judgments on the case of  Osman v
United Kingdom, judgment of 28 October 1998,
Reports 1998-VIII, § 128 and the case of M.C. v
Bulgaria, § 153.
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hence there was a violation of right to private life in
accordance with the Article 8 of the Convention.15
The assessment of the judgment
Substantive and timely topicality of the judgment 
Technically, the case concerned conditions of access to
the identity of the holder of a dynamic IP address
assigned by the internet service provider to a
subscriber. The questions concerning preventive
surveillance and the storing of communications data is a
live issue in many countries. This issue emerges
increasingly as a subject in court proceedings. The
human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms set
limits to the surveillance, storing and use of
communications data. The recording and retention of
data for the purpose of investigation is, on most
occasions, seen as a risk to privacy and other individual
rights and freedoms. In difficult cases, the issue is,
however, not of only of protecting individual rights
against interference by surveillance and data retention,
but, rather, of finding a correct balance between various
parties and their fundamental rights and freedoms.
The balance between the various rights and liberties
based on human rights and fundamental rights and
freedoms depends on the context, and the weight given
to the various arguments and rights is different
depending on each situation. The standards of
balancing are created in the legislation. The legislative
response, as well as the application of the legislation, is
subject to the standards that follow from the protection
of human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms
and, for the Contracting States of the European
Convention, developed mainly by the European Court of
Human Rights. The court itself admitted that States and
legislators have a margin of appreciation concerning the
choice of appropriate ways of ensuring the protection
for human rights, but the margin of appreciation is
circumscribed by the provisions of the Convention, and
the court, in the interpretation of them, must have
regard to changing conditions and respond to evolving
convergence as to the standards to be achieved.16
The ECHR wanted to say that the standards
controlling the legislators’ use of discretion in ensuring
protection are converging and tightening. In Europe, the
jurisprudence of the ECHR increasingly determines the
limits of the national law and the EC/EU law on
electronic evidence. It also acts as a balance between
privacy and freedom of expression and anonymity of
expression, both in vertical relations between public
authorities and individuals, and in horizontal
relationships between individuals themselves. For this
reason, domestic legislators must have a close look to
the evolving jurisprudence of the ECHR.
The content and efficiency of the right to private life 
The judgment in the case of K.U. v Finland does not
bring significant additional elements to the definition of
the concept of private life itself. In the judgment, the
ECHR rather shortly refers to its already established
case law on the matter, particularly to the judgment in
the case of X and Y v the Netherlands. Private life covers
and entails protection of the physical and moral
integrity of the person. In the ECHR case law, integrity is
also seen as a condition for physical and moral welfare.
In the judgment in the case of K.U. v Finland, the court
underlines the importance for the State to protect the
physical and moral welfare of children because of their
particular vulnerabilities.17 The court emphasised the
need to protect minors from the inappropriate
processing of information concerning sexual behaviour
and from approaches of potential sex offenders.18 In the
context of the case of K.U. v Finland, it is important also
to recall that communications data, traffic data, and the
retention of such data falls under the concept of private
life in article 8 of the Convention. The ECHR has
confirmed this in the judgment in the case of Copland v
the United Kingdom.19
The court sent an important message by recalling
that, contrary to the analyses under Finnish domestic
law and courts, the issue was not about calumny and
criminal investigation within the limits set by the
principle of legality, but that the situation in the case
should be analysed as concerning the protection of
individual integrity and the right to private life. The
court analysed the essential issues, and considered the
balance between fundamental rights and freedoms from
legal technicalities, which the domestic law had been
focused upon.20
The court’s assessment follows its earlier established
case law. The ECHR has developed a broad definition of
private life, and also underlined the point that the
concept is not susceptible to an exhaustive definition.
Private life covers, among other things, physical and
psychological integrity of a person and several aspects
15 K.U. v Finland, 49 – 50.
16 ECHR judgments in the case of K.U. v Finland, 44,
and, in the case of Christine Goodwin v the United
Kingdom [GC], no. 28957/95, § 74, ECHR 2002-VI.
17 X and Y v the Netherlands, § 22 and K.U. v Finland,
41.
18 K.U. v Finland, 46.
19 ECHR judgment on the case of Copland v the
United Kingdom, no. 62617/00, §§ 41 – 44, 3 April
2007.
20 K.U. v Finland, 41.
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of the physical and social identity of a person.21
The wide definition of the concept of private life and,
consequently, the wide duties of positive protection are
also significant with regard to the eventual
consequences of the application of the principles laid
down in the ECHR case law, including the judgment in
the case of K.U. v Finland, to the situations likely to
arise, for example, in the social media. The social media
is one of the environments where violations of privacy
and information security similar to the material events
in the case of K.U. v Finland are likely to arise in the
near future for investigation and legal proceedings. The
legislation and standard legal interpretations in many
countries are not necessarily well adapted to treat with
these kinds of problems. The law and the courts
sometimes struggle to find a judicial angle from which
to approach the violations of individual rights in the
context of information and communication networks. In
the case of K.U. v Finland, the ECHR provides some
essential elements concerning legislation and the
judicial approach concerning the assessment of the
alleged violations of private life and unfair processing of
personal information in such contexts of private and
social networks.
Private life in the system of the European Convention
is a wider concept than the right to informational self-
determination, which is at the core of the rights defined
by the EC Personal Data Directive 95/46/EC.22 The wide,
integrity-focused approach of the ECHR and the
approach emphasising the right to informational self-
determination complement each other in defining the
elements of protection in the context of electronic
communications and ICT systems. Together, these
approaches create a powerful legal response to address
some of the problems in the current ICT environment.
Non-existent or weak user-identification and
authentication of the parties may easily create problems
of fundamental rights and freedoms, and particularly
the right to the integrity of private life. Personal data
legislation can also be used to address these
weaknesses. In Finland, identity and authentication
have recently been raised as legal problems in the
context of the short term, high interest consumer credit
available through the mobile telephone, for example by
text messaging (SMS). Two problems have become
apparent in relation to the use of mobile telephones:
loans directed to minors, and the fraudulent use of
mobile telephones to purchase goods and services
without the consent of the subscriber of the connection.
The Data Protection Ombudsman, the national data
protection authority, has emphasised the requirements
of the EC Personal Data Directive and the Finnish
Personal Data Act to properly identify and authenticate
such consumer credit transactions.
Under the European Convention, the State has
positive duties of protection, which also extend to
physical and psychological integrity and the social
identity of a person. The judgment in the case of K.U. v
Finland can be interpreted to mean that legislation and
public authorities have an obligation, following from
article 8 of the European Convention, to arrange proper
identification and authentication in electronic
transactions when elements of personal integrity and
identity are in question.
A substantial and significant point in the judgment in
the case of K.U. v Finland is that the ECHR did not
accept the wide protection given to the freedom of
speech and anonymity of communications in the Finnish
law of the time. The court recognised that freedom of
expression and the protection of the confidentiality of
communication are primary considerations, and that
users of the internet must have guarantees for these
rights to be respected. At the same time, the ECHR
emphasised that the protection of the freedom of
expression and anonymity of communications is not
absolute, and must yield on occasion to other legitimate
interests. The ECHR calls for a balance between various
fundamental rights and freedoms and the rights and
interests of various parties.
The requirement of a fair balancing between various
interests and fundamental rights is strongly present in
the case law of the European level constitutional courts
in cases concerning access to communication data to
establish responsibility and liability in relation to
infractions of information-related rights. In the judgment
on the case of K.U. v Finland, the ECHR clearly
underlines that the balance is, in the fist place, for the
legislator. The legislator is required to provide the
framework for reconciling the various competing claims
for protection.23
The European Court of Justice recalled the need to
balance the various competing claims for the protection
of different fundamental rights and freedoms in the
judgment in Case C-275/06 Productores de Música de
21 For a short recollection of the various elements of
the concept of private life in the case law of the
ECHR, see the ECHR Grand Chamber judgment on
case S and Marper v United Kingdom [GC], nos.
30562/04 and 30566/04, § 66.
22 The Directive of the European Parliament and of
the Council 95/46/EC of 24 October 1995 on the
protection of individuals with regard the
processing of personal data and the free
movement of such data, OJ L 281, 23.11.1995, p. 31
– 50.
23 K.U. v Finland, 49.
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España (Promusicae) v Telefónica de España SAU,
judgment of 29 January 2008.24 Case C-275/06
concerned, among other things, the interpretation of the
EC Directive on Privacy and Electronic Communications
2002/58/EC in relation to the EC Copyright in the
Information Society Directive 2001/29/EC and the rules
concerning the effectiveness of the protection of
copyright and the interpretation of the EU Charter on
Fundamental Rights in this context.25 The ECHR in turn
referred to the EC Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications 2002/58/EC in the arguments in the
case of K.U. v Finland. The Directive on Privacy and
Electronic Communications is, together with the
Electronic Communications Data Retention Directive
2006/24/EC, a core part of the EU legislative framework
for the protection and access to communications data.
The specific issue in the Promusicae case was the
access to communications data held by the internet
operator in an alleged infringement of copyright. In its
judgment, the European Court of Justice underlined the
need for the national courts to develop and apply such
interpretations of EU Directives and national legislation
implementing directives that enable the achievement of
a fair and proper balance between various fundamental
rights and freedoms. Concerning the interpretation of
the EC Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications, the European Court of Justice stated
that neither the Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications nor the EC Copyright Directives require
the Member States to arrange for the retention of
communications data in court proceedings that aimed
at providing for liability under civil law. Directives do not
exclude either form of retention if it is provided in
national legislation and leads to a fair balance between
various fundamental rights and freedoms, and respects
the general principles of law, in particular the principle
of proportionality. The European Court of Justice
reminded Member States that pursuant to article 15 (1)
of the EC Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications, Member States are allowed to provide
for exceptions on the confidentiality of communications
data – among other things for the purposes of
preventing, investigating and the prosecution of crime.26
Both the ECHR and the European Court of Justice,
underline the role of the legislator to balance the
competing fundamental rights and freedoms in various
contexts. Since the context of the judgment of the
European Court of Justice in case C-275/06 Promusicae
was the interpretation of law in pending court
proceedings, the ECJ went on to consider further
specifications for the method of interpretation and role
of the courts. In comparison, the ECHR, in the case of
K.U. v Finland, considered the appropriateness of the
protection given by the legislation at the time. The
European Court of Justice went on to explain why EC
law, in particular the Directive on Privacy and Electronic
Communications, was fairly abstract and provided little
direct guidance for a judge in a concrete case, but that
this gap has to be filled by the State legislator and the
national courts in interpreting the applicable EU and
national legislation.27
To understand the European law concerning access to
communication data, the judgments of the ECHR in the
case of K.U. v Finland, and the European Court of Justice
in Case C-275/06 Promusicae, should be read together.
Apart from emphasising the role of legislators and the
need to balance rights and duties, the European Court
of Justice took up the particular role and methods of the
interpreting judge and stated that the Union legislator
had not provided for the retention of communications
data in civil proceedings concerning infringements of
copyright. EC Electronic Communications Data Retention
Directive 2006/24/EC provides for the storage and
retention of data linking a communication to an identity,
and traffic data for the purposes of the investigations of
crimes. The ECHR considered, in particular, that
children, because of their vulnerabilities, require
particular protection for the private life and right to
physical and moral integrity and right to psychological
security. The ECHR stated that sexual abuse of children
is unquestionably an abhorrent type of wrongdoing.28 In
the context of sexual abuse, the State legislators
should, to enable a fair and proper balance between
competing claims for the protection of fundamental
rights and freedoms, arrange for access to
communication data to allow effective investigation of
alleged offences. The assessment in the cases
concerning infringement of copyright might be different.
24 Judgment of the European Court of Justice (Grand
Chamber) of 29 January 2008 in C-275/06
Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) v
Telefónica de España SAU, ECR [2008] I-271.
25 Directive 2002/58/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 12 July 2002 concerning the
processing of personal data and the protection of
privacy in the electronic communications sector
(Directive on privacy and electronic
communications), OJ L 201, 31.7.2002, p. 37–47.
Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 22 May 2001 on the
harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and
related rights in the information society, OJ L 167,
22.6.2001, p. 10–19.
26 Judgment of the European Court of Justice in C-
275/06 Promusicae, paras 60 - 70.
27 The European Court of Justice has extended this
apology for abstract writing style to the EC
Personal Data Directive 95/46/EC, see the
judgment of the European Court of Justice of 7
May 2009 in Case C-553/07 College van
burgemeester en wethouders van Rotterdam v M.
E. E. Rijkeboer, not yet reported in ECR.
28 ECHR judgment in the case of K.U. v Finland, 49
and also the ECHR judgment in the case of
Stubbings and Others v the United Kingdom, 22
October 1996, § 64, Reports 1996-IV.
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The ECHR and the European Court of Justice are right
to emphasise the role of the legislator in balancing
freedom of expression and the right to confidentiality of
communications against the right to effective protection
of private life. Legal certainty is improved when the
framework for balancing can be read clearly from the
legislation. This enhanced role of the legislator also fits
well with the principles of democracy.
In practice, however, the ECHR sets very far-reaching
duties and obligations on the State legislator, whereas
the European Court of Justice seems to be more realistic
about the possibilities the EC legislator has in the
provision of guidance through abstract, universal norms
to all potential conflicts and competing claims for
protection in different circumstances that Member
States face.29
A fairly detailed and far-reaching specification of the
role and responsibilities of the Contracting State
legislator by the ECHR in ensuring the protection of
private life in the changing social and technological
context is a very significant point in the judgment on the
case of K.U. v Finland. The ECHR said the court was
sensitive to the argument of the Finnish government
that any legislative shortcoming should be seen in the
light of its social context at the time. The court stated
that it accepted the view of the difficulties involved in
policing modern societies. The positive obligations to
protect fundamental rights and freedoms should be
interpreted in a way that does not impose an impossible
or disproportionate burden on the legislator or
authorities. The court recalled that another relevant
consideration is to ensure that powers to control,
prevent and investigate crime are exercised in a manner
that fully respects the due process and other
guarantees of the fundamental rights and freedoms,
including guarantees on which the accused can rely
on.30
The ECHR requires the legislator to ensure there are
clear and well-defined expressions of the outcomes of
the balance that must be taken in legislation. But the
court also requires the respect of the principle of
proportionality, and applies the principle of
reasonableness according to which the positive
obligations to ensure the protection of private life or
other fundamental rights do not make it necessary to
take measures that cause a disproportionate burden to
the public authorities. The principle of proportionality
applied by the ECHR provides that in the horizontal
relations between individuals, the positive duties of
protection should not create a disproportionate burden
to other concerned private persons. These principles are
fairly abstract, albeit they are easy to accept as guiding
principles of balancing of the benefits, costs and
burdens. A significant point in the judgment in the case
of K.U. v Finland, is that (concurring with earlier case
law) the ECHR defined the standards concerning
measures that should be considered, and what counts
as a disproportionate burden or difficulty in policing. A
significant point is that this is, according to the court, a
matter ultimately to be assessed by the ECHR from the
perspective of the protection of human rights and
fundamental rights and freedoms, albeit the legislator
of the Contracting State has a margin of appreciation
and is required to define the necessary and appropriate
measures for the protection of fundamental rights.
The limitation of the State’s margin of appreciation by
the Convention and the principles laid down in the case
law of the ECHR is not a novelty, but well established
case law of the court.31 Noticeable in the judgment in the
case of K.U. v Finland is the extent of the control exerted
by the ECHR over the choices made in State legislation.
The court was sensitive to the Finnish government’s
argument about noting legislative shortcomings in the
social context at the time, but the court considered that
in 1999, when the material events of the case of K.U.
took place, it was well known that the internet could be
used for criminal purposes and that a wide-spread
problem of the sexual abuse of children existed. The
court went further to state that it could not be said that
the government lacked the opportunity to put in place a
system to protect children from being exposed via the
internet. The court considered, thus, that the
government of Finland had, in breaching article 8 of the
Convention, failed to take measures that could provide
practical and effective protection for the applicant’s
private life by enabling the authorities to identify and
prosecute the person who had placed the offensive
advertisement on the internet based dating service.32
The judgment can be read so that the ECHR places a
particular obligation on the government and legislator
of a Contracting State to follow societal and technical
developments and risks, and to take such effective and
practical action that are necessary to protect the human
and fundamental rights and freedoms guaranteed by
the Convention. The ECHR seems to require an active
and systematic approach to learning about social
29 European Court of Justice in C-275/06 Promusicae,
para 67, and also the judgment of the European
Court of Justice in C-553/07 concerning the abstract
writing style of the EC Personal Data Directive.
30 K.U. v Finland, 48.
31 The ECHR cited in the judgment in the case of K.U.
v Finland its earlier judgment on the case of
Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom [GC], no.
28957/95, § 74, ECHR 2002-VI, on the margin of
appreciation see K.U. v Finland, 43 and 44.
32 K.U. v Finland, 48.
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problems and risks to fundamental rights, and to the
management of risks to ensure the effective protection
of fundamental rights.
The ECHR is certainly right to require such an
approach in order to ensure a good level of protection of
fundamental rights. This is a significant point for which
all governments and legislatures should pay attention
to. In many countries, there remain important caveats
and items of out-dated legislation in the face of new
models of network society and network based
communications. Governments and legislatures can only
adequately discharge this duty by combining a
systematic information and communication technology
assessment with a regular general effectiveness
assessment of legislation and a review of legislation.
The lack of such analyses may be a weak point for
several governments. In a legal science perspective, a
skills and analyses of ICT law and legal informatics is
required.
Use of criminal law in the protection of private life and
the requirement of efficient investigations
A significant point in the judgment in the case of K.U. v
Finland is how far the positive duties for the protection
of private life extended in the domain of criminal law.
The deterrence by the mere general threat of sanctions
was not considered a sufficient protection of private life.
Following case law from the judgment in case of Airey v
Ireland, the ECHR stated that article 8 of the Convention
contains not only the negative obligation to refrain from
interference with an individual’s private life, but also the
positive obligation to secure respect for private life in
relations between individuals.33 The Contracting States
have a margin of appreciation on the choice of
measures, but this margin of appreciation is controlled
by the requirements set out in the Convention and
developed in the case law of the court. The general
requirement for the measures of protection is that they
must be efficient. According to the court, this means
that in grave acts against private life there should be
practical and efficient criminal law measures available.34
In K.U. v Finland, the scope of the acts in which efficient
criminal law protection is required was extended to a
situation that, according to the court, was not trivial but
did not have the same seriousness as some of the
situations cited in the earlier case law of the court.35
Criminal law is the instance of ultimate state power.
Because of the restrictive and punitive character of the
criminal law, the use of it and criminal policy is guided
by the principle of the last resort (ultima ratio) of
criminal law or, the subsidiarity of criminal law,
according to which criminal law shall be used only as
the measure of last resort when other, morally more
acceptable measures are unable to provide sufficient
and efficient protection. In several countries, the last
resort of criminal law is recognised as a policy principle
or policy guideline and in some, for example in Germany
and as an application of the principle of proportionality
in Finland, it is even recognised as a principle of
constitutional law.36
In K.U. v Finland and in the earlier case law in which
the requirement of the efficient criminal law protection
is set, the ECHR does not seem to discuss the
application of the last resort principle to the situations
in the material events of cases. In the judgment of K.U. v
Finland, the court explicitly rejected the Finnish
government’s argument that there were other means
and remedies available to K.U., and moved on to require
practical and efficient criminal law protection.
The court may be too optimistic about the
possibilities of criminal law to provide efficient
protection for the protection of identity and other
essential aspects of private life. On the other hand, the
court is right that essential aspects and values of
private life need protection by criminal law and thereby
recognised as the core values to be protected by the
State. The protection of private life and the provision of
secure physical, moral and psychological identities can
be achieved by attempting to provide for proof of
identity and authentication in ICT systems and
information networks. Without dispute, there are the
essential elements for the feeling of security for
individuals.
The ECHR is right to emphasise this aspect and the
duties of the State to provide protection against
infractions of these rights related to the right to private
life. However, the success rate of investigations in
crimes conducted through anonymous messages on the
internet is limited. This is the case in general in relation
to all computer related crime. Pushing the requirements
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33 ECHR judgments in the cases of K.U. v Finland, 42
and Airey v Ireland, judgment of 9 October 1979,
Series A no. 32, § 32.
34 ECHR judgments in the cases of X and Y v the
Netherlands, judgment of 26 March 1985, Series A
no 91, §§ 23-24 and 27 and M.C. v Bulgaria, n0
39272/98, § 150, ECHR 2003-XII.
35 K.U. v Finland, 43 and 44.
36 In Germany the principle of last resort, the
subsidiarity of criminal law is recognised as a
principle in the judgments of the Federal
Constitutional Court, see in particular judgment of
the Federal Constitutional Court in BVerfGE 39, p. 1
(p.47) and BVerfGE 88, p. 203 (p. 257-258).
Principle of last resort is discussed in legal
literature in all Nordic (Scandinavian) Countries
and it is recognised as policy guideline in the
official policy documents of the government
concerning drafting of criminal law in Sweden,
Norway and Finland. In Finland, the Constitutional
Law Committee of the Parliament, which is the
highest interpreter of the abstract constitutionality
of the proposed Acts of Parliament, requires an
assessment if certain conduct is to be penalised
and it is necessary for the attainment of the legal
good, and the protection required cannot be
achieved by other means.
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for criminal law protection too far may be problematic in
the view of the last resort principle. Realising this
approach in practice may require extensive police
measures that may also become problematic in view of
the balancing that is required between various rights
and claims for protection. The ECHR is not beyond the
reasonable limits of criminal law. The court emphasised
that in the case of K.U. v Finland, the essential concern
was the need to protect minors from sexual abuse, and
here there are no problems with regard to the principle
of proportionality and the principle of last resort of
criminal law. However, a cautious reading of the ECHR
case law will be needed in order not to widen, without
proper thought, the scope of protection under the
criminal law without considering alternative measures.
Given the international character of the problem of the
sexual abuse of children and the internet, efficient
solutions must of necessity be international in scope.
This is indirectly recognised by the court, which
presents in very a positive light the Council of Europe
Convention on Cybercrime as the only wide international
instrument that deals with computer and internet-
related crime, and which also states that in the
assessment of the efficiency of the protection of private
life, the court has to take into account the evolving
convergence of the standards to be achieved.37
Another domain in which problems of the practical
effectiveness of user identity have emerged recently is
the web-casting and publishing possibilities of the
internet, such as YouTube. Such services can be used
for anonymous connection, and it has not been possible
for law enforcement agencies to identify the
perpetrators of violent threats on the basis of the
dynamic IP addresses that the publication service
providers have disclosed. Traces end at a third country
server providing anonymous services.38 The principles
laid down in the ECHR judgment on the case of K.U. v
Finland, and in the EC Electronic Communications Data
Retention Directive 2006/24/EC, or the Council of
Europe Convention on Cybercrime, are efficient and
effective only if the legislative measures to implement
these principles are reasonably global and all countries
have law enforcement functions with a sufficient level of
integrity and rapidity to offer and provide effective
international assistance for investigations.39 A global
problem in the global networks requires a global
answer. Although the approach taken by the ECHR is
sound and correct, the efficiency of the protection
required by the ECHR may still be limited.
An important point in the judgment in the case of K.U.
v Finland is that the ECHR rejected the Finnish
government’s argument that civil liability and deterrence
caused by the general threat of criminal sanction – the
general prevention – gave sufficient protection for
private life. The court continued, in K.U. v Finland, to
develop its case law further, that investigations and
prosecution of the crime should be effective in practice,
and only this practical effectiveness of criminal
investigations provides the necessary level of protection
when the physical and moral wellbeing of a child is at
stake. The court considered, in particular, that the
implementation of practical and effective protection
required that effective steps should be taken to identify
and prosecute the perpetrator. The overriding
requirement of the confidentiality of communications
data in the Finnish national law in force at the material
time of the events of the case prevented the perpetrator
from being identified and thus, also an effective
investigation.40
A significant contribution of the judgment in the case
of K.U. v Finland is the requirement of the practical
effectiveness of investigations of alleged offences as
part of the protection of private life in accordance with
article 8 of the Convention. Here, the court went beyond
the concept of effectiveness of an individual
investigation, but sees success of the investigations in a
wider perspective of efficiency of legal protection. The
legal order and procedures protecting fundamental
rights and freedoms have to be efficient as a system,
and they must enable success in individual cases.
The idea of the practical effectiveness of rights and
the availability of remedies is not a novelty as such. The
practical effectiveness of rights and availability of
remedies are, rather, part of the very concept of the
rights in the system of the European Convention of
Human Rights and in case law of the ECHR. This
emphasis on the practical effectiveness has also made
the European Convention one of the most successful
international systems for the protection of human rights
and fundamental rights and freedoms. The law does not
remain in books, but the law is of practical protection to
individuals.
The ECHR considered, in K.U. v Finland, that this
general principle of practical effectiveness required the
37 K. U. v Finland, 24 and 44; see also ECHR judgment
in Christine Goodwin v the United Kingdom [GC],
no. 28957/95, § 74, ECHR 2002-VI.
38 This problem has emerged in the investigation of
the threats of violence presented trough social
media. The aliases behind the dynamic IP
addresses assigned by a third country anonymous
server have proven to be very difficult to
investigate.
39 Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the
retention of data generated or processed in
connection with the provision of publicly available
electronic communications services or of public
communications networks and amending Directive
2002/58/EC, OJ L 105, 13.4.2006, p. 54–63. The
Council of Europe Convention on Cybercrime,
opened for signatures on 23 November 2001, and
the Additional Protocol to the Cybercrime
Convention adopted in 2003.
40 K.U v Finland, 48 and 49.
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availability of appropriate and efficient means and
methods of investigations of alleged crimes and a legal
framework that provides the availability of such
methods. This will have, if taken seriously and
generalised, significant consequences for the law on
evidence and access to electronic evidence. The court
indicated that it is a requirement for the protection of
fundamental rights and freedoms to store and retain
electronic evidence, including communications data,
and to provide for access to it in police investigations
when essential aspects and values of private life are at
issue, and the concern is about the protection of
children or other persons with particular vulnerabilities.
In the light of the case law of the ECHR, the police
should also be provided with sufficient resources and
expertise to carry out such investigations.
These requirements will add an important additional
aspect to the legal and legislative debate about
obtaining access to communication data and the
surveillance of such data. The storing and retention of
communications data is not only a threat to individual
rights, on some occasions it is required for the
protection of fundamental rights. In the case of Copland
v the United Kingdom, the court set out some general
criteria where access to communications data and
communications surveillance may be granted under the
European Convention of Human Rights.41 The K.U. v
Finland judgment complements this approach well.
The requirement set by the ECHR is a fair one, but not
without difficulties in practice. In societies based on the
rule of law, the criminal law and criminal justice system
exist to protect the individual and his fundamental
rights and freedoms. In recent developments, the
functioning of the criminal law, criminal procedure and
investigations, and the activities of the criminal justice
system are increasingly analysed and defined from the
perspective of their capacity to protect and respect
fundamental rights and freedoms. The judgment in K.U.
v Finland adds to this development. The Contracting
States should, as a consequence, evaluate whether the
criminal law and procedure and the law concerning
access to communication data and other significant
sources of electronic evidence correspond to the test of
being able to provide effective practical protection – and
beyond that, to guarantee the overall efficiency of the
protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. But it is
necessary to be cautious about not falling into the
fallacy of believing that criminal law and criminal
investigations alone could provide sufficient protection
for the essential aspects and values of private life.
Effect beyond the criminal law: privacy-friendly
information and communication infrastructure 
In the case of K.U. v Finland, the ECHR required an
effective means of identifying the person who placed
the advertisement. Indirectly, this requirement means
that both the legislation and the information and
communication infrastructure, including the ICT
architecture, should provide for the reliable
identification and authentication of the parties to a
communication, and access to past communications
data. In the other recent case on private life, where
Finland was the responding government and where a
violation of the right to private life was also found, the
case of I. v Finland, the ECHR stated, at 47, that: ‘What
is required in this connection is practical and effective
protection to exclude any possibility of unauthorized
access occurring in the first place. Such protection was
not given here.’ In this context, it is necessary to provide
for the proper security of IT and archive systems,
including the requirement of an effective audit. In I. v
Finland, the ICT system failed to record who had been
obtaining access to and consulting confidential files,
access to files was not restricted only to those members
of the staff who were responsible for the treatment of a
particular individual. These failures were considered to
constitute a breach of private life.42 The judgment in I. v
Finland makes it clear that the obligations of the State
are to ensure that confidential data stored in an ICT
system must be held securely; only authorized
personnel may be given access to the data, and it
should be subject to effective audits. Similar obligations
also exist concerning the identity and recording of
communications data and the traffic data.
A picture emerges from the ECHR judgments by which
the court makes it clear that an information and
communication infrastructure and ICT architecture,
including the software code and functions, should be
designed to protect fundamental rights and freedoms.
Proper information and communications security is an
essential element of this infrastructure and architecture.
Keeping logs and transaction records, secure storage
and controlled access to communications identification
and traffic data, and reliable and secure identification
and authentication of the parties of communications are
part of this infrastructure and architecture that emerge
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41 ECHR judgment in Copland v the United Kingdom,
3 April 2007, no. 62617/00, §§ 45 – 48.
42 I. v Finland, judgment of 17 July 2008, no.
20511/03.
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from the ECHR case law. The court has contributed
significantly to providing strong and highly authoritative
human rights foundations for the development of the
general principles of ICT law, or to the general doctrines
and principles of legal informatics, to guide planning
and management of information and communication
systems and networks. The Contracting State is required
to provide a practically effective legal framework for
such rights-friendly infrastructure.
The first consequences of this should be that the
functioning of the anonymous servers, that is servers
providing a system that aims to make the identity of the
parties to communications difficult or impossible,
should be critically assessed in all countries. On many
occasions, anonymity is compatible with the
requirements of fundamental rights and freedoms, but
not in all cases. The anonymity of the communications
over the internet should be put into a wider and more
critical perspective. Secondly and even more
significantly, the enforcement of the Data Protection
laws requiring confirmation of identity and
authentication should be assessed and strengthened,
and legislative caveats corrected. Thirdly, legislators
have the duty to provide an effective response to the
risks to secure identity. The last issue is an old theme in
the literature in computer and ICT law – in this, the
ECHR has not provided any additional arguments and
foundations for such an approach.
Conclusions 
The judgment in the case of K.U. v Finland is significant,
because it requires Contracting States to ensure high
quality IT systems are in place in order to provide for the
positive obligations of the protection of private life in
relations between individuals themselves. In addition,
the court also requires Contracting States to have
practical and effective legal protection in place,
including criminal sanctions, to provide for the
protection of private life. This judgment requires
governments and legislators to follow societal and
technological developments, and to ensure that the
legislation in force can provide effective protection. The
court extended the principle of practical effectiveness of
protection and its implication to require practical
effectiveness of investigations to cover electronic
evidence and information necessary to identify the
perpetrator of the alleged offence. Legislators are
required to provide for access to communication data,
and governments should ensure the conditions for
successful criminal investigations in cases where
essential values and elements of private life are at risk.
The protection of children against sexual abuse through
the internet is essential, because values and elements
of private life are in danger, and the right to freedom of
expression and anonymity of communications must be
over-ridden when dealing with such cases for the
benefit of effective investigation. The court has also
indirectly defined further general requirements based
on human rights and fundamental rights and freedoms
concerning the principles of ICT law. In particular it is
now necessary (although it has always been so) to
consider the implications for security surrounding the
identity of parties to communications and the retention
of communications data. The ECHR addresses actual
and difficult issues relating to crimes occurring in the
context of the internet and the need to identify the
parties to communications, and also the conditions for
success in criminal investigations of serious computer
and cyber crime. The ECHR has, in the case of K.U. v
Finland, contributed to the development of European
and international law on electronic evidence and the
protection of private life through criminal law.
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Introduction 
The advent of the internet has transformed the
world of commerce. Electronic commerce allows
businesses to buy and sell in global markets that
are no longer bound by geography or time.
Increasingly, governments, businesses and
consumers are using information technology and
the internet to exchange information, produce,
market, buy, sell and even deliver products and
services to places virtually unreachable before.
Electronic signatures,1 in particular digital
signatures,2 have been established with the
objective to authenticate and facilitate
commercial transactions in the electronic
environment.
Several initiatives have been implemented over the last
decade in order to provide legal recognition to
electronic signatures. At a global level, the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) has provided model laws that offer a
legislative guide to countries on the framing of their
national electronic signature legislation.3 At a regional
level, the Electronic Signature Directive has been enacted
by the European Union (EU) in an attempt to ensure
consistency and legal validity of electronic signatures
across member states.4 In addition to legislation on an
international and regional level, over ninety individual
countries have also legislated for the use of electronic
signatures. Typically, legislation has taken one of three
types of approaches: a minimalist or technology-neutral
approach where any technology can be used as an
electronic signature provided it satisfies the legal function
of a signature;5 a digital signature or technology-specific
approach6 that recognises the primary use of digital
signatures generally to the exclusion of other forms of
electronic signature; and a dual approach that provides
an evidentiary presumption in favour of validity of an
electronic signature if the parties use specific
technologies, in particular, digital signatures issued by
recognised certification authorities.7
In Australia, a technology-neutral legislation was
enacted in 1999, the Electronic Transactions Act 1999
(Cth) (ETA).8 Based on this Commonwealth legislation,
States and Territories have enacted similar electronic
signature and transaction legislation.9 The provisions of








1 One definition of ‘electronic signature’ is provided
by article 2(a) of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Signatures 2001 art 2(a), ‘as data in
electronic form in, affixed to or logically associated
with, a data message, which may be used to
identify the signatory in relation to the data
message and to indicate the signatory’s approval
of the information contained in the data message.’
2 A digital signature is a type of electronic signature,
and is described in paragraph 36 of the Guide to
Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on
Electronic Signatures (2001) as ‘created and
verified by using cryptography, the branch of
applied mathematics that concerns itself with
transforming messages into seemingly
unintelligible form and back into the original
form’.
3 See UNCITRAL Model Law on Electronic Commerce
1996 and Model Law on Electronic Signatures
2001.
4 Directive 1999/93/EC of the European Parliament
and of the Council of 13 December 1999 on a
Community framework for electronic signatures, OJ
L 13, 19.01.2000, p.12.
5 Most common law countries have adopted the
minimalist approach towards legislation. These
include the US, the United Kingdom, Canada and
New Zealand.
6 The technology-specific approach has also been
referred as a prescriptive approach in the literature.
7 The EU Electronic Signatures Directive is a good
example of a dual approach. The legislation in
China and Singapore are also considered as a dual
approach. See Electronic Transactions Act 2004
(China) (for a translation and introduction into
English of the Chinese Act, see Minyan Wang and
Minju Wang, Translation and Introduction to the
Electronic Signatures Law of China, Digital
Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review 2
(2005) 79 – 85, and Electronic Transactions Act
1998 (Singapore).
8 Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth).
9 The state level Acts are: Electronic Transactions Act
2000 (NSW); Electronic Transactions Act 2000
(SA); Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (Tas);
Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (ACT); Electronic
Transactions Act 2003 (WA); Electronic
Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic); Electronic
Transactions (Queensland) Act 2000 (Qld);
Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act
2000 (NT). Note that since the State legislation is
essentially the same as the Electronic Transactions
Act 1999 (Cth), the discussion in this article is
confined to the provisions of the latter legislation.
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the ETA are based on the Model Law on Electronic
Commerce 1996 (MLEC) which is the first model drafted
by the UNCITRAL.
Despite the legislative initiatives at global, regional
and national levels to promote the use of electronic
signatures, anecdotal evidence and reports in the media
indicate that there has been a very slow take-up of the
digital signature technology across the world. A
progress report on the EU Electronic Signature Directive
in 2006 expressed concern with regards to the slow
take-up of digital signatures across its twenty-five
member states.10 ‘The reluctant take-up of electronic
signature tools is slowing down the growth of trade in
goods and services via the internet,’11 asserted a press
release, without any evidence. Other countries such as
Germany and Thailand have also reported low
acceptance of digital signatures in recent years.12 Some
scholars in the field have expressed concern that the
culture of the failure to adopt digital signatures by
individuals and businesses is hard to change.13
Likewise, it has been almost nine years since the ETA
has been enacted in Australia, but the use of electronic
signatures, particularly digital signatures, has been
low.14 Note that while the legislation was enacted to give
an impetus to e-commerce at all levels, digital
signatures are mostly used for government on-line
services.15 Anecdotal evidence shows that there has
been a low use of digital signature technology among
businesses when dealing with other businesses for
contracts and commercial transactions, despite the
Australian government’s effort to promote it as ‘a valid
form of authentication for enabling and sealing e-
commerce transactions’.16
Research questions 
This led the author to consider a number of questions.
Why is there a lack of acceptance of digital signatures
by the business community in Australia for entering into
contracts and commercial transactions with each other?
What could be the likely factors to impede the use of
electronic signatures, in particular, digital signature
technology in a regulated environment?
The objective of this article is to briefly outline the
findings of a comprehensive investigation conducted by
the author as part of his doctoral thesis to identify
factors that have contributed to the low acceptance of
electronic signatures, in particular digital signatures, in
the Australian business community. The research was
an empirical study relying predominantly on the views
and experiences of various groups of people from large
country-wide public listed companies in Australia. A
sample of 27 participants comprising of heads of the
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10 Commission of the European Communities, Report
on the operation of Directive 1999/93/EC on a
Community framework for electronic signatures




11 ‘Electronic signatures: legally recognised but
cross-border take-up too slow, says Commission’




12 eGovernment, Take-up of electronic signatures
remains low in Germany (2004) epractice.eu (no
longer available); Pascale Prud’homme, and
Hassana Chira-aphakul, E-Commerce in Thailand: A
slow awakening, Thailand Law Forum http://thaila
wforum.com/articles/e-commerce.html.
13 Heiko Roßnagel ‘On Diffusion and Confusion-Why
Electronic Signatures Have Failed’ in Simone
Fischer-Hübner Steven Furnell, Costas
Lambrinoudakis, editors, Proceedings of the Third
International Conference on Trust and Privacy in
Digital Business (TrustBus 2006) 71; Jane K Winn,
‘The Emperor New Clothes: The Shocking Truth
about Digital Signatures and Internet Commerce’
(2001) 37(2) Idaho Law Review 353; Raymond
Perry, ‘Digital Signatures - Security Issues And
Real-World Conveyancing’ (2001) 151 New Law
Journal 1100. See also in the Australian context,
Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee,
Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Fraud and
Electronic Commerce (2004) (180)
http://www.parliament.vic.gov.au/dcpc/Reports/DC
PC_FraudElectronicCommerce_05-01-2004.pdf.
14 Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee,
Parliament of Victoria, Inquiry into Fraud and
Electronic Commerce (2004) 180
http://nla.gov.au/nla.cat-vn3093816.
15 Inquiry into Fraud and Electronic Commerce
(2004). The areas in which digital signatures are
being promoted are: Australian Customs Service,
SPEAR Project run by Land Victoria and EC
(Electronic Conveyancing) system, a part of the
Land Exchange Program within the Victorian
Government’s Department of Sustainability and
Environment. The latest position is that these
projects are currently running at a very small scale.
Unfortunately, there is no recent information or
reports that are available on these.
16 National Office for the Information Economy,
Government Role in B2B E-Commerce (2001)
Department of Communications, Information
Technology and the Arts
www.archive.dcita.gov.au/2001/10/b2b_e-
commerce/. The Drug and Crime Prevention
Committee report states that digital signatures are
used primarily with the ATO and not for other
services.
‘The reluctant take-up of electronic signature
tools is slowing down the growth of trade in
goods and services via the internet,’asserted a
press release, without any evidence.
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Information Technology (IT) and legal departments and
senior management (SM) executives was used. A series
of semi-structured interviews were conducted face-to-
face or by telephone. The interviews were then
transcribed and analysed by the author using the
matrix-based framework analysis approach commonly
used in applied policy research.17 This article first
summarises the main findings of the research. It is then
followed by a critical discussion, followed by a number
of recommendations for measures that may overcome
the low use of electronic signatures in the business
community.
The main findings
The empirical research demonstrated that there are six
potential factors that are likely to have led to a low use
of electronic signatures in the Australian business
community. These are ignorance or lack of
understanding of the technology and the law governing
the technology, security concerns, legal obstacles,
complexity and confusion, cost concerns, and culture
and customs.
Ignorance or lack of understanding
A major finding of this research is ignorance. In general,
participants revealed a considerable lack of
understanding of the term electronic signature and the
legislation governing them. Businesses appear to have
a limited understanding of the various forms of
electronic signature, not to mention digital signature,
although they are using a particular form of electronic
signature (i.e. e-mails) on a day-to-day basis. Such lack
of awareness is identified as the leading reason for
businesses’ hesitance to use digital signatures.
Ignorance or lack of understanding of the term
electronic signature
About a quarter of the participants admitted having
never heard of the term electronic signatures. Others
who were aware of the existence of this term
demonstrated very limited understanding of the various
forms that electronic signatures take. An electronic
signature was generally believed to be a scanned image
of a manuscript signature. In addition, there appeared a
certain confusion between the term electronic and
digital signature. The terms were used interchangeably
during the interview process by a few participants.
Ignorance about the legislation
A high degree of ignorance also prevailed among
businesses with regard to the legislation governing
electronic signatures, in particular the ETA. More than
two-thirds of the participants were not aware of the
provisions of the ETA and the provisions relating to
electronic signatures in Australia. Their lack of
awareness emerged from comments such as: ‘I don’t
know what the law is on using electronic signatures;18 ‘I
am not aware of any such law’.19 On the other hand,
those who were aware of the legislation mostly
demonstrated a very limited knowledge of the
provisions in the ETA. The following responses were
noted from participants: ‘I am not aware of it being a
recognised form;’20 ‘I know there are viable options and
there are rules around it but I do not know in great
detail;’21 ‘We really haven’t gone and explored the wider
legal aspect of understanding or where the law sits with
17 Note that a five-stage framework analysis method
was adopted for analysing the interview data. In
stage 1 (familiarisation), the author familiarised
himself with the interview transcripts and obtained
an overview of the collected data. In stage 2
(identifying a thematic framework) an initial coding
was conducted from the issues emerging from
stage 1 to set up a thematic framework. The
thematic framework at this stage was only
tentative and further refining was made at
subsequent stages of analysis. In stage 3
(indexing), the initial coding, or in other words the
thematic framework, was applied to the data
collected through the use of textual codes to
identify those segments of the interview
transcripts that reflected a particular theme.  In
stage 4 (charting) specific pieces of data
corresponding to a particular theme were
identified from the interview transcripts and
arranged in charts, with each chart representing a
specific theme. After all the indexing and charting
were done in accordance with the themes, in the
final stage 5 (mapping and interpretation), the key
characteristics of the data collected were examined
with a view to mapping and interpreting the data
set as a whole. The above five steps were carried
out with the help of NVivo, a software package well
known for the analysis of qualitative data.
18 P2_Co2_Legal, Paragraph 31.
19 P12_Co7_SM, Paragraph 76.
20 P16_Co4_Legal, Paragraph 68.
21 P18_Co11_Legal, Paragraph 197.
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22 P14_Co9_SM, Paragraph 123.
23 P21_Co12_Legal, Paragraph 10.
24 P8_Co5_Legal, Paragraph 114.
25 For example, P15_Co10_Legal, Paragraph 63.
26 P2_Co2_Legal, Paragraph 88.
27 P24_Co15_Legal, Paragraph 55.
28 P6_Co4_Legal, Paragraph 76.
29 Especially for Non-Individual digital signature
certificates or Organisation digital signature
certificates.
30 In the case of digital signature, it is the private key
that the subscriber activates to create a digital
signature.
31 P18_Co11_Legal, Paragraph 124.
it;’22 ‘There are some legislation in 2001, the Electronic
Transactions Act or something like that. That is all I
remember but I am not deeply familiar with it.’23
Businesses’ lack of awareness and understanding of the
legislation appeared to be largely responsible for their
lack of appreciation of the different forms that an
electronic signature can take. In fact, the research
revealed a high level of ignorance at the level of
lawyers’ and legal advisors. A failure to understand the
legislation appears to have potentially weakened
businesses’ confidence in using electronic signatures.
Security concerns 
The research sought participants’ views on whether
security is an issue with the use of electronic
signatures. In general, participants were quite
concerned about the security aspect of electronic
signatures. The majority of the participants believed
that businesses have not embraced the idea of
integrating digital signatures into their work
environment for a number of security reasons. There
were concerns that the technology that currently exists
does not provide sufficient safeguards to users. As a
result it will be impossible for digital signatures to be
used as a secure form of authentication. ‘It’s very much
the insecurity of the whole thing that is why it hasn’t
been widely accepted,’24 claimed one participant.
Participants were generally concerned that someone
could hack into another person’s computer system and
maliciously use his or her digital signature without the
person’s knowledge.25 ‘[T]he last thing you want for the
other party [to the contract] to say is that ‘hang on I
didn’t sign it, that wasn’t me, I didn’t do it,’26 remarked a
participant.
The security fears expressed by participants were
both of technical and legal nature. From a technical
standpoint, participants feared that a person could
fraudulently use someone else’s digital signature and
pass it as his own. ‘[O]nce it’s on the computer anyone
can access it. ... it’s pretty easy to get hold of it if you
want to get it,’ remarked a legal participant.27 From a
legal stance, participants feared that a plaintiff would
not be able to satisfy the court that a forger has forged
or affixed his digital signature. As remarked by one of
the participants, ‘when it comes down to proving, you
don’t know if this was actually executed by the named
person.’28
There are three basic ways that digital signatures can
be secured, through the use of passwords where a
digital signature is stored on the hard disk of a
computer; using portable information storage devices
(PISDs); and using biometric devices. Issues were raised
with all three methods of securing digital signatures.
Hard disk secured with password 
The most common form of storage of a digital signature
is on the hard disk of a computer.29 A user wishing to
affix his digital signature will use a key board or a
mouse (or both) to activate it,30 and the signature will
then be attached to a particular data message. However,
the risk is that the same command can be given by
anyone else who also has access to that computer,
because it is the computer that ‘signs’ rather than the
actual owner of the digital signature. To protect from
such risks, the storage of digital signatures on the hard
disk of a computer can be secured through the use of a
password or PIN. Participants were in general of the
view that passwords can adequately protect against
unauthorized and malicious access to computers.
However, it was also noted that despite password
security policies implemented by their organisations’ IT
department, staff would rarely abide by them. They
would often choose passwords that would be easy to
guess, or fail to change them at regular intervals as
recommended. An IT participant stated:
When you log into a system you are given a default
password. My experience is that fifty percent of the
people still have that password so ... anywhere down
the track ... I am not sure what we really have to do ...
I think if we have to move on to that ... take steps to
really follow through on forcing people to change
their passwords.31
A failure to implement precautionary measures has
made digital signatures behind such passwords prone
to attack. Therefore, despite the common belief among
participants that the storage of a digital signature on a
computer could be secured through the use of
passwords, their careless attitude towards password
use and management made the hard disk an unsafe
option for storing electronic signatures.
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PISDs
Digital signatures can also be stored on PISDs, such
as a smart card or a Universal Standard Bus (USB) token
(also known as a flash disk). A smart card is amenable
to cryptographic implementation and thus enables the
subscriber to sign and encrypt a document.32 A USB
token such as a flash disk, however, is not amenable to
cryptographic implementation but can conveniently be
plugged into the USB port which is available on most
computers and laptops.
In general, participants considered the use of PISDs
such as smart cards and flash disks to be unsafe.
Concerns were raised by participants that PISDs could
easily be lost or stolen and used for malicious purposes.
‘[I]f you lose a smart card who is to decide that someone
else cannot read that smart card or use it,’33 remarked a
participant. However, they believed that if the PISD was
secured with a password or PIN that would provide
adequate security.
Biometric measurements
Apart from passwords and PISDs, another method of
securing digital signatures is through the use of
biometrics.34 In this case, instead of using a password or
a PISD (or both) to obtain access to his or her digital
signature, a subscriber uses a biometric measurement
such as fingerprint and retina scan. By using this
method, although not perfect, it becomes harder for a
malicious attacker to break in and use the signature
than any other security mechanisms such as a password
or PIN. With the exception of a few operational
limitations, participants generally considered biometric
measurements to be the most secure method of storing
a digital signature. Their perceived views about
biometric measurements were reflected in comments
such as: ‘that’s probably a little bit more secure if it’s
thumb print ... that sounds fairly secure’;35 and ‘I guess
to crack biometric or fingers or retina or whatever, is not
easily accessible to most people’.36
The internet and the intranet
The internet, a prerequisite for the usage of digital
signature technology, was mostly believed to be
insecure, although it was not considered to be a
significant deterrent to the use of digital signatures.
Those who found the internet insecure made remarks
such as: ‘I am not sure how safe the internet is … I have
concerns as to the safety of it but that is not to say that I
won’t use it’;37 and I don’t think the internet is
completely secure once you are in there it’s pretty open
and anything can happen’.38
However, some participants believed that although a
digital signature uses encryption technology and can
therefore secure documents traversing over the internet,
it is still at risk from hackers because most office
computers are connected to the internet or an intranet.
According to some participants, the real risk of forgery
of a digital signature does not arise primarily from the
use of the internet but from fraudulent actions within an
organization. As remarked one participant:
The fraud normally is an internal fraud than
transmission fraud and so I think the euphoria of
people collecting thousands of cards through
siphoning and data out of pay pal and things like that
... yes, a fairly strong imagination.39
Legal concerns
Legal concerns associated with electronic signatures
were also identified as a potential factor that could
contribute to its low use for contracts and commercial
transactions. In particular, the lack of admissibility of
electronic signatures in the court of law and
complexities arising with evidentiary matters when
proving authenticity of electronic signatures were raised
by participants.
Admissibility of electronic signatures
A high proportion of participants, in particular legal
participants, believed that electronic signatures would
not be admissible in evidence. Occasionally, their legal
advisors would discourage them to use electronic
signatures on the grounds of their admissibility in a
court of law. A legal participant remarked:
To the end 2001 I worked on Electronic Data
Interchange (EDI) type of contracts. I worked for the IT
department but I have to say that apart from the EDI
type stuff which never took off no-one was
particularly interested in electronic signatures and the
lawyer wouldn’t either. The lawyer would say, ‘look I
don’t understand all these stuff or the law won’t
necessarily accept it as evidence or it’s too difficult.
Just rely on paper or fax or something like that’.40
32 Johan Borst, Bart Preneel and Rijmen Vincent,
‘Cryptography on Smart Cards’ (2001) 36(4)
Computer Networks 423, 423.
33 P2_Co2_Legal, Paragraph 64.
34 Note biometric measurements can also be
considered as a form of electronic signature, but
are usually used to establish whether the person
you are dealing with is the person entitled to the
service.
35 P2_Co2_Legal, Paragraph 64.
36 P4_Co3_Legal, Paragraph 113.
37 P6_Co4_Legal, Paragraph 189.
38 P25_Co15_IT, Paragraphs 96.
39 P26_Co16_SM, Paragraph 57.
40 P1_Co1_Legal, Paragraph 61.
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41 Stephen Mason, Electronic Evidence: Disclosure,
Discovery & Admissibility, (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007) 2.20; 4.16-4.35.
42 P1_Co1_Legal, Paragraph 77.
43 P18_Co11_Legal, Paragraph 68.
44 P6_Co4_Legal, Paragraph 76.
45 P18_Co11_Legal, Paragraph 228.
46 P1_Co1_Legal, Paragraph 19.
47 P1_Co1_Legal, Paragraph 28.
48 P22_Co13_Legal, Paragraph 82.
49 P5_Co3_IT, Paragraph 66.
50 P5_Co3_IT, Paragraph 110.
51 A digital signature certificate from an accredited
Certification Authority such as VeriSign costs
A$130-200 in Australia.
52 Note that because the research confined to large
Australian businesses it may be a reason that cost
was not an issue. It may be an issue for small
businesses.
53 P2_Co2_Legal, Paragraph 48.
Evidentiary matters
Concerns were expressed about the inconclusiveness of
an electronic signature, given there is no physical
document that is signed. The general view of the
participants was that the law of evidence would
struggle to deal with electronic signatures in the
absence of original physical documents. Since there is
no concept of an original digital object or a signature
generated electronically,41 the concept of primary
evidence and secondary evidence cannot be applied in
the context of electronic signatures. Views were
expressed that courts would require the original
document containing the electronic signature to identify
the signer. ‘The court will always look for an original.
There is only one document that is an original and that
is the evidence, the primary evidence,’ claimed one
participant.42 ‘The law very much clings to originals with
a signature on it to show that they have been correctly
executed between the parties,’43 remarked another one.
Participants also feared that, unlike a manuscript
signature, it was not possible to witness an electronic
signature, thus adding another layer of complication.
They believed that there is no provision in the law that
allows the witnessing of an electronic document, in
particular, an electronic signature:
On certain contracts the execution calls provision for a
witness to sign. … they will then go to the court and
testify, ‘I saw that authorized officer signing this
document.’ With an electronic signature I find that
very difficult to do.44
Finally, electronic signatures were subject to disapproval
by participants who claimed that, unlike manuscript
signatures, electronic signatures cannot undergo
handwriting tests and therefore identifying the actual
signatory becomes harder in case of a dispute. Thus, if a
person intent on committing a fraud hacks into
someone else’s computer and fraudulently uses his or
her electronic signature to gain an unfair advantage, it
would be difficult to convince the court that neither the
owner of the computer nor any authorized person used
the owner’s signature. In contrast, with manuscript
signatures, it was asserted that a fraudulent signature
can easily be identified with the help of handwriting
experts. One participant offered the following comment:
I think it would be rather difficult showing that or try
to prove that there is a probability that someone else
could have logged on [with electronic signatures] …
With a manuscript signature often you just need a
proof. Someone can bring somebody who knows the
signature or you can do handwriting tests.45
Complexity and confusion 
The general perception among participants was that the
use of electronic signatures was complex and confusing.
However, these issues were raised mostly in the context
of the digital signature while other forms of electronic
signature were not necessarily perceived as complex to
use. In particular, the digital signature technology was
found to involve complicated application programs that
would render it unfriendly to use; a complex setting-up
process, and a stringent requirement for the recipient
organisation to be equipped with a similar technology.
The perceived views about the complexity and
confusion were reflected in comments such as: ‘I
suspect that the reason for that [its non-acceptance] is
that it is so complex to set up’;46 or ‘the big issue is …
that it’s a pain in the ass to set something up,’ 47 ‘You
can’t do it … you can’t use and communicate with that
technology until you establish that the other party has
that technology. I guess it adds another level of
complication’.48
Cost
From the point of view of costs, the expenses involved in
educating and training staff was identified as an
important factor that could deter the use of electronic
signatures. ‘There is the cost of educating them as well
and we are not interested in doing that’;49 the cost [of
electronic signature] includes training and deployment’50
were typical remarks made by participants.
On the other hand, the cost of obtaining digital
signature certificates51 was not considered to be a
disincentive with regard to the use of the technology.
Such costs were trivial for participating companies.52
They claimed that their organisation could easily afford
to use the digital signature technology. ‘I wouldn’t
imagine that cost would be prohibitive because big
companies would spend a lot more on IT systems,’53 or ‘I
don’t think cost would be an issue you know, if it make
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things speedier … I can’t imagine it would be costly,’54
were typical remarks made by participants.
Culture and customs
Another issue raised by a few participants that could
inhibit the use of electronic signatures is the culture and
custom associated with manuscript signatures.
Participants believed that the use of manuscript
signatures has become a part of the Australian business
culture and custom, and this acts as a significant
deterrent to the use of electronic signatures. Relative to
an electronic signature, a manuscript signature was
considered a ‘tried and trusted method of signing
documents’55 for hundreds of years for executing
contracts and commercial transactions by the business
community. ‘A handwritten signature is a cultural thing
at the moment,’56 remarked a participant. ‘Things have
always been done via pen and paper,’57 claimed another
participant.
Discussion and recommendations
The above section has set out an outline of the various
factors that participants identified as potential
impediments to the adoption of electronic signature
technology. These factors comprise ignorance or lack of
understanding of the electronic signature technology
and the law governing the technology; security; legal
obstacles; complexity and confusion; cost, and culture
and customs. Some of these concerns raised are
legitimate. For instance, the complex setting-up process
of the digital signature technology, the stringent
requirement for the recipient organisation to be
equipped with a compatible technology or the cost of
staff training can result in significant hurdles for
businesses. However, several of the concerns raised by
participants appear to be unfounded and based on
misconceptions.
Ignorance and lack of understanding of the
technology was identified as a key impediment to the
use of electronic signatures for contracts and
commercial transactions in the Australian business
community. Because of the lack of awareness,
businesses are unable to appreciate the benefits of this
technology. It is suggested that they need to recognise
that electronic signatures have the capability to
enhance their performance and capabilities, and provide
them the ease of signing contracts, joint ventures and
conduct electronic commerce sitting in front of their
computer anywhere in the world.
It is therefore important that resources be provided
for training and education programmes for members of
staff who are directly or indirectly involved in the use of
the electronic signature technology. If the prevailing
ignorance, lack of understanding and confusion about
the new technology can be addressed, businesses will
realise that electronic signatures, in particular digital
signatures, can be a secure alternative to manuscript
signatures for conducting on-line contracts and
commercial transactions. In this respect, the Australian
Government Information Management Office (AGIMO)
that overlooks the Gatekeeper (which provides
accreditation to certification authorities (CAs) to issue
digital signature certificates) can play an important role.
Other bodies such as the Law Council of Australia (LCA),
the Australian Corporate Lawyers Association (ACLA)
and the Australian Computer Society (ACS) can also
collaborate to promote the use of the technology given
its techno-legal nature.
Security concerns were identified as another
significant barrier to the use of electronic signatures. In
particular, businesses raised concerns with regard to
their storage. If electronic signatures are stored
properly, their misuse can be minimised. However,
participants’ views indicated that despite password
security policies implemented by their organisation’s IT
team, staff would not abide by them. Such lackadaisical
attitudes towards the use of passwords are in
conformity with various studies and surveys that have
investigated password security.58 Such weak passwords
can be effortlessly obtained either through the help of
social engineering59 or obtained with the use of
software.60
On the other hand, replacing passwords with
biometric measurements can be a secure option, but is
not necessarily a perfect alternative. A computer with an
electronic signature stored on its hard disk would most
likely be connected at some stage or the other to the
internet or an intranet, or both. With the use of either
intranet or the internet, there are high risks of remote
attacks within an organisation or from a hacker sitting
thousands of miles away. Remote attacks can bypass
54 P15_Co10_Legal, Paragraph 141.
55 P18_Co11_Legal, Paragraph 120.
56 P2_Co2_Legal, Paragraph 27.
57 P18_Co11_Legal, Paragraph 133.
58 Ernst & Young, Global Information Security Survey
2006 at http://www.ey.com/; Steven Furnell,
‘Authenticating Ourselves: Will We Ever Escape the
Password?’ (2005) 3 Network Security 8, 9;
Stephen Mason, Electronic signatures in Law,
10.36.
59 For more details on social engineering and
password security see Michael E. Whitman, Herbert
J. Mattord, Management of Information Security
(Course Technology, 2004).
60 Joseph A. Cazier and B. Dawn Medlin ‘Password
Security: An Empirical Investigation into E-
Commerce Passwords and their Crack Times’
(2006) 15(6) Information Systems Security 45, 47.
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61 For example, software such as Inspector Copier can
remotely back up data from the individual’s
computer by bypassing the operating system
protections.
62 It is possible that electronic signatures stored on a
smart card may be susceptible to risks from the
internet. This could happen during the process of
signing a document, because the smart card is
connected to the computer that is in turn
connected to the intranet or internet. During this
period, a remote attack is possible on the
electronic signature. However, since the smart card
is in contact with the intranet or internet for only a
very short period, this threat is minimal as
compared to when electronic signatures are stored
on a computer’s hard disk which is often
connected permanently to the internet or intranet.
However, the Network Smart Card can overcome
this problem to a considerable extent. See Hong
Qian Karen Lu, ‘Network smart card review and
analysis’ International Journal of Computer and
Telecommunications Networking Volume 51, Issue
9 (June 2007), 2234-2248 and Joaquin Torres,
Antonio Izquierdo and Jose Maria Sierra,
‘Advances in network smart cards authentication’
International Journal of Computer and
Telecommunications Networking Volume 51, Issue
9 (June 2007), 2249-2261.
63 In the past few years smart cards have become
more powerful and secure, for which see Bart
Preneel, ‘A Survey of Recent Developments in
Cryptographic Algorithms for Smart Cards’
International Journal of Computer and
Telecommunications Networking Volume 51, Issue
9 (June 2007) 2223-2233 and Joaquin Torres,
Antonio Izquierdo and Jose Maria Sierra,
‘Advances in network smart cards authentication’
International Journal of Computer and
Telecommunications Networking.
64 Note the former federal government was planning
to introduce the national identity card that would
have used the smart card technology. The intention
was to replace a number of existing cards,
including the Medicare card and various benefit
cards issued by Centrelink and the Department of
Veterans’ Affairs with the ID card. Had this project
been implemented, it would have probably helped
users to become familiar with the smart card
technology given the broad-based use of Medicare
and Centrelink cards. For issues related to such
cards see Graham Greenleaf, ‘Function Creep –
Defined and Still Dangerous in Australia's Revised
ID Card Bill’ Computer Law & Security Report,
Volume 24, Issue 1, 2008, 56-65; Graham
Greenleaf, ‘Australia’s Proposed ID Card: Still
Quacking like a Duck’ Computer Law & Security
Report Volume 23, Issue 2, 2007, 156-166;
Margaret Jackson and Julian Ligertwood, ‘Identity
Management: Is an Identity Card the Solution for
Australia?’ Prometheus Vol. 24, No. 4. (2006), 379-
387.
65 Paul Reid, Biometrics for Network Security (Prentice
Hall, 2004) 10.
66 With advances in the smart card technology, it is
now possible to have a fingerprint sensor on the
smart card itself instead of the computer: ‘A
standards-based biometric smart card – at what
cost?’ Biometric Technology Today, Volume 16,
Issue 1, January 2008, 3-4; Denis Praca and Claude
Barral, ‘From smart cards to smart objects: the
road to new smart technologies’ Computer
Networks Volume 36, Number 4, 16 July 2001, 381-
389.
67 Sections 8, 9, 10, 11, 12 of the ETA and s 3, 48, 146
of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth).
68 Electronic Communications Act 2000 (UK) s 7(1).
69 For a discussion on primary and secondary
evidence in the context of electronic signatures,
see Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law,
14.10.
operating systems security, thereby making any desktop
security measures such as biometric measurements,
including passwords, redundant.61 In order to protect
electronic signatures from risks associated with the
internet or intranet, a possible option is to store them
on secure PISDs.62
Among all forms of PISD, smart cards appear to be the
most secure.63 However, most participants
demonstrated very little understanding of smart cards,
particularly the technology associated with them. They
were often wrongly believed to be embedded with the
magnetic stripe technology, as are most bank credit
cards in Australia. Educating the business sector about
the technology underlying smart cards might overcome
the prevailing ignorance and misunderstanding.64 To
address this issue, the use of biometric measurements
may be considered as an alternative to passwords for
securing smart cards. While the body is capable of
providing several types of biometric measurement, the
use of fingerprint has proved itself to be the most
suitable technology to date from a security and usability
aspect.65 Thus, it is possible to achieve a higher degree
of security by storing a biometric measurement of a
fingerprint on the same card that stores a digital
signature. A link can be made between the person
whose private key is stored on the card and the identity
of the person in possession of the card. If such a
comprehensive security infrastructure is adopted, digital
signatures are protected from malicious acts to the
degree that the technology can be considered to be
reasonably secure.66
Concerns regarding the admissibility of electronic
signatures and the evidentiary issues appeared to be
another important impediment to the use of electronic
signatures in the Australian business community. On the
one hand, participants revealed significant ignorance
with respect to the law governing electronic signatures
in Australia, in particular, the ETA and the law of
evidence. The knowledge of lawyers and legal advisors’
in this area did not appear to be up-to-date. On the
other hand, participants raised some valid arguments
with regard to evidentiary matters.
Admissibility concerns raised by participants were in
general futile. Both the ETA and the Evidence Act 1995
(Cth) provide rules and guidelines that can be used to
prove an electronic signature.67 Participants’ concerns
regarding this issue are therefore not exactly tenable.
They are mostly characterised by an ignorance of the
law underlying electronic signatures. It is arguable that
separate provisions on admissibility of electronic
signatures in evidence in the ETA would provide more
clarity on evidentiary matters related to electronic
signatures. On this note, it is useful to point out that the
Electronic Communications Act 2000 from the UK,
explicitly states that electronic signatures are
admissible in evidence in any legal proceedings.68 The
UK Act thus provides a useful model for Australia.
With regard to evidentiary issues, participants
expressed concerns about the inconclusiveness of an
electronic signature, claiming that there is no actual or
original document that is signed. In their contention, the
law of evidence would struggle to deal with electronic
signatures, because there is an absence of primary
evidence.69 Such views appear to be based on a
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In any event, notaries across the world have taken practical steps to
develop techniques to provide for the witnessing the signing of a
digital document on a computer with an electronic signature by both
the signing party and the notary.
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
misunderstanding of the current law of evidence.
Although the common law position enunciated over 250
years ago was that the best evidence rule70 (which
includes producing original documents containing
signatures) should be followed to determine the
existence of a signature, this law no longer prevails in
the Australian federal and in several state jurisdictions.71
Because s 51 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) has
abolished the common law principles of the best
evidence rule for proving a document’s contents, the
production of an original document is no longer a
mandatory requirement to prove a fact. Thus,
participants’ concerns with regard to the absence of
original documents with electronic signatures are
unfounded and emanate from their lack of awareness of
the current legal position in this regard.
With regard to witnessing the application of a
signature, participants feared that unlike manuscript
signatures, it is not possible to witness a person affix an
electronic signature to a document.72 Witnessing in the
electronic realm has also been described as a complex
issue by a few scholars.73 However, they do not rule out
the possibility of witnessing an electronic signature, in
particular, digital signatures. Witnesses can use their
digital signature to attest an electronically signed
document. The witnessing of such documents would
require that computers involved in signing the
document be technically evaluated to trusted evaluation
criteria.74 In such an environment, the attester would
verify the authenticity of the document through the
signer’s public key and would in turn witness the
signatory’s signature using his digital signature.75 In any
event, notaries across the world have taken practical
steps to develop techniques to provide for the
witnessing the signing of a digital document on a
computer with an electronic signature by both the
signing party and the notary.76
The issue of witnessing has been explicitly provided
for in a few jurisdictions’ legislation. For example, the
Electronic Commerce Act 2000 passed in Ireland,
provides that electronic signatures can be witnessed
electronically provided certain requirements are
satisfied. In particular, the main document must specify
that it requires witnessing, and the signature of the
signatory and the witness must be an advanced
electronic signature (that is, a digital signature) based
on a qualified certificate.77 The Electronic Transactions
Act 2002 in New Zealand also makes explicit provisions
for the witnessing of electronic signatures.78 A similar
provision if inserted in the ETA will eliminate the
70 The best evidence rule can be traced back to more
than 250 years to the case of Omychund v Barker
(1745) 26 ER 15, 33. Lord Harwicke in the case
stated that for evidence to be admissible it must
be ‘the best that the nature of the case will allow’.
In other words the contents of a document are only
admissible if the party attempting to adduce
evidence of the contents is able to tender the
original document. Traditionally, this rule has
operated to eliminate evidence which has not been
the best evidence, such as a copy of a document.
This was basically the issue raised by participants
when they expressed concerns about the original
and copy of a signature. For a detailed
understanding of the best evidence rule see
Edward W Cleary and John W Strong, ‘The Best
Evidence Rule: An Evaluation in Context’ (1965) 51
Iowa Law Review 825.
71 The States and Territories in which the best
evidence rule has been abolished are New South
Wales, Victoria, Australian Capital Territory and
Tasmania. Note that these States and Territories
mirror the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). See ss 48 and
51 of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth). The States and
Territories in which the best evidence rule are still
active are South Australia, Western Australia,
Northern Territory and Queensland.
72 Although see the US case of an electronic will,
Taylor v Holt CA Tennessee Knoxville 18 August
2003, where the electronic signature of the testator
was witnessed by the witnesses, who in turn
added their electronic signatures to the document;
discussed in Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures
in Law, 10.16.
73 Adrian McCullagh, Peter Little, and William J Caelli,
‘Electronic Signatures: Understand the Past to
Develop the Future’ (1998) 21(2) University of New
South Wales Law Journal 452, 462.
74 Adrian McCullagh, Peter Little, and William J Caelli,
‘Electronic Signatures: Understand the Past to
Develop the Future’. A lack of trusted systems may
bring into question the legal validity and certainty
of such actions.
75 Adrian McCullagh, Peter Little, and William J Caelli,
‘Electronic Signatures: Understand the Past to
Develop the Future’.
76 By way of introduction, see the work of the Hague
Conference on Private International Law and the e-
APP (Electronic Apostille Pilot Program)
http://www.e-app.info/.
77 Electronic Commerce Act 2000 (Ireland) s 14.
78 Section 23 of the Electronic Transactions Act 2002
(NZ) specifically entails provisions for witnesses to
witness a document using an electronic signature,
if: (a) where a signature is being witnessed, that
signature is also an electronic signature; and (b)
the electronic signature of the witness meets
requirements that correspond to those for a
primary signature – that is, the electronic signature
adequately identifies the witness and adequately
indicates that the signature or seal has been
witnessed; is as reliable as is appropriate given the
purpose for which, and the circumstances in which,
the signature of the witness is required; and, in the
case of a witness’s signature on information
required to be given to a person, the recipient of
the information has consented to the use of an
electronic signature rather than a traditional paper-
based signature.
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79 Generally two main aspects of a signature are
considered: pictorial representation and the
construction of letters. It is common for forgers to
focus on pictorial details such as slope, size and
spacing but they often fail to copy the way the
letters are constructed, such as the direction of the
letters. In addition, the signature is also verified on
the basis of the attributes of the instrument used
to affix the signature such as how smooth the
signature has been signed and whether it is jagged
or confident. See Stephen Mason, Electronic
Signatures in Law, 1.17.
80 Lorna Brazell, Electronic Signatures Law and
Regulation (Sweet & Maxwell, 2004), 8-014.
81 Lorna Brazell, Electronic Signatures Law and
Regulation, 8-014. Note intrusion detection
systems can only detect intrusions but cannot
prevent them.
82 Mark Sneddon, Legal Liability and E-Transactions:
A Scoping Study for the National Electronic
Authentication Council (2000) 3.2, available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/docu
ments/APCITY/UNPAN014676.pdf.
83 Mark Sneddon, Legal Liability and E-Transactions:
A Scoping Study for the National Electronic
Authentication Council (2000).
84 Fitzgerald and others argue that ETA is a light-
touch legislation because it does not define the
electronic signature: Anne Fitzgerald, Timothy
Beale, Yee Fen Lim and Gaye Middleton, Internet
and E-Commerce Law, (Lawbook Co., 2007) 552.
85 Electronic Transactions (Amendment) Ordinance
2004 (HK).
86 ETA s 10. Note the clause ‘the recipient has agreed
to the usage of that method’ is an extra provision
in the ETA as compared to the MLEC.
87 Adrian McCullagh and William J Caelli, ‘Non-




88 ETA s 10.
89 Sharon A Christensen, William Duncan and Rouhshi
Low, ‘The Statute of Frauds in the Digital Age -
Maintaining the Integrity of Signatures’ (2003)
10(4) Murdoch University Electronic Journal of Law
http://www.murdoch.edu.au/elaw/issues/v10n4/chr
istensen104.html.
concerns of the Australian business community that
electronic signatures and documents cannot be
witnessed.
Electronic signatures were also subject to disapproval
because they cannot undergo handwriting tests.
Participants claimed that unlike manuscript signatures
which can be verified using handwriting tests,79
identifying the actual signatory becomes harder when
an electronic signature is used. However, there are other
ways of testing whether an electronic signature is
genuine and authorized. The operations of the
information system from which the signature originated
at the time when the signature was created can be used
to prove the genuineness of a signature.80 Further,
intrusion detection systems may be used to establish
whether the document was signed maliciously by an
intruder.81 This may however require a high standard of
information security systems. Nevertheless, this may
not necessarily be a foolproof means to identify the
actual signatory. In the case of electronic signatures, the
identity of the actual signatory will be a matter of
inference. Inference may be weak in those cases where
the holder of the private keeps his key in a computing
platform that cannot be trusted, such as an office or
home computer.82 The inference may be stronger in
those cases where better evidence of a signer’s identity
has been provided through a biometric measurement
and a PISD or both.83
Some participants claimed that businesses would
willingly switch over from the practice of manuscript
signature to electronic signatures for endorsing
contracts and documents if they received adequate
legal advice. Providing adequate legal advice is,
however, quite challenging for legal advisors if there are
fundamental drawbacks in the electronic signature
legislation. A major shortcoming of the ETA is that it
does not provide the definition of an electronic
signature.84 This can be rectified if the Act is amended to
incorporate the definition of electronic signature and
digital signature. Other countries such as Hong Kong
have already implemented such changes in their
legislation.85 Similar amendments in the ETA will help
the Australian business community and other people
that use electronic signatures every day (the PIN on a
bank or credit card, the signature at the bottom of an e-
mail) understand what an electronic signature
represents. Clarity in the legislation is in turn likely to
enhance businesses’ confidence towards the use of the
technology.
Furthermore, section 10 of the ETA (based on article 7
of the MLEC) that deals with the use of signatures in the
electronic environment, recognises the validity of
electronic signatures under certain terms and
conditions without describing what an electronic
signature is. In particular, it states that where a
Commonwealth law imposes the completion of a
transaction through the means of a signature, the use of
any method (presumably electronic signature) is valid,
provided the method satisfies the following four criteria:
it identifies the person who made the signature;
it indicates the person’s approval to the contents of
the document signed;
it is as reliable as is appropriate for the purpose for
which it is used; and
the recipient has agreed to the usage of that
method.86
Clearly, this section is vague and ambiguous, making it
difficult to attribute a precise meaning to its provisions,
and is the subject of criticism from scholars eminent in
the field of electronic signatures. McCullagh and Caelli
condemned the legislation on the ground that it does
not provide ‘any guidance as to what within the
electronic commerce environment is or is not a valid
electronic signature’.87 According to Christensen and
Low, that ‘the method must be as reliable as is
appropriate for the purpose for which the information
was communicated’88 is nothing but confusing.89 What is
considered appropriate in the circumstances, argued
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Christensen and Low, could be based on the parties’
personal preferences and a court’s ex-post facto
rationalisation of individual approaches, and therefore
could vary greatly with no consistent pattern.90 For
example, the appropriateness of an electronic signature
may not be the same for a day-to-day ordinary
transaction as for complex business transactions
involving large sums of money.
In the same vein, Mason argued that the reliability
test is unrealistic. According to him, if the parties to a
contract have agreed in good faith on a particular
technology and have acknowledged that the contract is
authentic and valid, the court should not question its
authenticity and validity on the grounds of reliability.
‘There should be no need for any court to take the
matter any further,’ remarked Mason.91
The lack of clarity in the provisions relating to
signatures in the electronic environment is a major
drawback in the ETA and other jurisdictions whose
electronic transactions laws are based on the MLEC. It
would indeed be hard for legal advisors to advise
businesses to use electronic signatures with such loose,
imprecise and ambiguous provisions in the laws. Note
that post MLEC, two other set of laws, the Model Law on
Electronic Signatures 2001 (MLES) and the Convention,
have been drafted by the UNCITRAL that address the
drawbacks in the initial model law but to date the ETA
has not been amended accordingly.
The complexity of the electronic signature, in
particular digital signature, was regarded as another
hindrance to the use of electronic signatures by
participants. However, the complexity of the technology
can also optimistically be regarded as an attribute. Seen
from a different perspective, due to its complex nature,
digital signatures can only be used by authorized
people who have acquired an expertise or training in
this respect. Thus, the complexity of the technology can
potentially enhance its security by restricting its use.92
It appears that much of businesses’ confusion with
electronic signatures arises from an ignorance or lack of
understanding of the technology. The electronic
signature technology, in particular digital signatures, is
not necessarily as complex as it is perceived. This
perceived complexity is often the result of poor
understanding and lack of information.
Economically, the expense involved in educating and
training staff was identified as an important deterrent
towards the use of digital signatures by participants.
However, businesses may reconsider that the use of
digital signatures may justify the expenses involved in
their use, because of the slightly greater security.
Although in the short run they may incur certain
expense in terms of training and educating their staff,
the long run it is possible that the gains might outweigh
the expenses.
Conclusion
This article identifies the potential reasons underlying
Australian businesses’ hesitance to use electronic
signatures, in particular digital signatures, for contracts
and commercial transactions in a fast developing and
regulated e-environment. It also provides some useful
suggestions to overcome the low use of the technology
in the business community. While legislative and
technological shortcomings are identified as being
important factors that can make businesses hesitant to
adopt electronic signatures, the perception of people in
business are often not supported by reference to the
actual legislation or to the technology underlying
electronic signatures. Rather, there is significant
evidence of Australian businesses’ lack of awareness
and understanding of electronic signatures and the
associated legislation, despite a regulatory framework
to facilitate their use. It is unlikely that any perfection of
either electronic signature technology or the legal
environment for electronic signatures will see a greater
use by the business community of such signatures until
knowledge of these things becomes more pervasive.
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90 Sharon A Christensen, William Duncan and
Rouhshi Low, ‘The Statute of Frauds in the Digital
Age - Maintaining the Integrity of Signatures’.
91 Mason’s argument is in the context of article 7 of
the Model Law on Electronic Commerce 1996,
which can also be applied to ETA because s 10 of
the ETA is a replication of article 7 of the model
law. Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law,
3.18.
92 Some commentators consider digital signatures to
be the most secure form of electronic signature,
although a number of companies in Russia bear
witness to having large sums of money removed
from their bank accounts by an unknown
unauthorized third party, who obtained the private
key of the company, and then initiated the transfer
of the money without the authority or knowledge
of the company, for which see Olga I.
Kudryavtseva, ‘The use of electronic digital
signatures in banking relationships in the Russian
Federation’, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 5 (2008) 51 – 57 and
Resolution of the Federal Arbitration Court of
Moscow Region of 5 November 2003 N -А
40/8531-03-, Digital Evidence and Electronic
Signature Law Review, 5 (2008) 149 – 151.
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1 Although a video recording of a transaction does
not prove anything if the ATM clock and video
clock are not synchronized, for which see a murder
case where the wrong people were arrested in the
USA in Stephen Mason, editor, Electronic Evidence:
Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007), 3.20-3.22.
2 Prima facie evidence in Germany is similar to a
presumption in English jurisprudence.
3 See in detail Gerwin Haybäck, Risikohaftung bei
missbräuchlichen Bankomatbehebungen: Ein
österreichisch-deutscher Rechtsvergleich (Neuer
Wissenschaftlicher Verlag GmbH Nfg KG, 2008), 45
and following.
4 See the report: ‘Bankomat: Kartensperre schützt
nicht’ (‘ATM: Card blocking does not protect’),
available at: http://www.klartext.at/downloads/
presse/bankomat kartensperre nuetzt nicht.PDF.
5 Note by editor: card issuers purport to have
mechanisms in place to detect fraud of this nature,
so if a card issuer fails to implement the mechanism
where large amounts are removed from an account
that is not within the normal spending patter of the
card holder, the fault may be with the card issuer,
not the card holder. Fraud detection is a pattern
recognition problem and it can be carried out either
using expert systems where people write the rules,
or training a system by providing data, and for it to
establish the rules. However, detecting fraud is far
more complex. It is necessary to consider what
types of fraud are known, then to be alert to a
change in fraud patterns that avoid the previous
patterns, then when new patterns are detected, the
new patterns must be countered. It is necessary to
understand that in attempting to detect fraud, the
early cases of a new type of fraud may not be
detected for some time. A significant problem when
dealing with allegations that a customer is
responsible for a withdrawal from an ATM, is that
nobody in this field will explain what they are
looking for, or publishes any analysis on how good
they might be at identifying patterns of fraud.









The liability for unauthorized withdrawals at
automatic teller machines (German: Geldautomat;
Austria: Bankomat) (ATMs) and point of sale
terminals (POS) is caused by the manipulations of
unauthorized third parties, sometimes because of
the incautious behaviour of the cardholder, where
the loss of a card is exacerbated as a result of the
PIN being recorded with the card in some way. The
bank may also refrain from taking precautions,
such as providing an effective shield to terminals,
refusing to record a transaction with the use of
video or CCTV,1 and failing to provide for increased
program code and internet safety. The aim of this
article is to discuss what can be considered a fair
allocation of risks. It deals with system security
and different methods exercised by criminals in
order to detect the personal identification number
(PIN). The prima facie evidence granted in favour
of the bank is a controversial issue discussed in
relation to substantive law and case law.2
Introduction
The first time a card holder may become aware that an
unauthorized transaction might have occurred at an ATM
or POS, is when they notice an unknown debit posting on
their current account.3 Accordingly, the card holder will
probably inform the card issuer that the posting is an
unknown withdrawal against their account, and the debit
should be refunded.
The card issuing bank, on the other hand, will probably
respond by pointing out that only the card holder knew
the PIN, which can be four numbers (as in the UK for
instance) or four or five numbers (as in Germany for
instance). This means it is assumed that the card holder
has complete control over the card (also known as bank
card, payment card, bank customer card, debit card). The
card issuer may well reach the conclusion that either the
card holder must have withdrawn the respective amount
at the ATM, or they authorized a third person so to do, or
they were so negligent as to permit an unauthorized third
person to obtain possession of the card and PIN. Where
the card holder loses control over their PIN or card, or
both PIN and card, it may be that third persons have
obtained the card and discovered the PIN, then they
attempt to remove as much cash as possible before the
card is retained. Whatever happens, the law of evidence
and how the pleading are drawn up will be of great
importance in establishing which party is put to proof to
prove their case.
Occasionally, a criminal will obtain possession of
several charge or credit cards, and within a short period
of time, the maximum amount is removed because the
criminals know that the card is blocked only after two (or
more) hours.4 The card issuer notices the theft only after
some time.5 Consequently, the ATM card is frequently
blocked too late. Therefore, it is important to establish
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criteria for the distribution of risks and charges between
the contracting parties. The allocation of risks
concerning the damages caused by third parties is of
importance, especially if the offender is unknown or has
no assets when caught and successfully prosecuted. On
the one hand the card holder is obliged to use the two
components (card and PIN) together. On the other hand,
the card holder always has to keep the two components
strictly separated for security reasons. The most
frequent attacks are to manipulate an ATM, or to create
a cloned card. Occasionally, criminal energy focuses
upon discovering secret numbers.
Concerning the substantive law of contract, it is
necessary to determine the duties of care the card
holder is required to comply with. Second,
consideration must be given to the standard of care and
security that should be the responsibility of the credit
services sector. This article primarily deals with the
security of the PIN system. In addition, the question of
liability concerning the PIN (as the present electronic
instrument of identification) is discussed. The analysis
deals with the liability for damages in civil law, not
criminal law.
Liability and the German EC system
The German EC ATM system is a participant of the
European Europay ATM system and the Global Maestro
system.6 There arrangements permit transnational
withdrawals at ATMs and POS payments for goods and
services. When the EC card (including the Maestro logo
as well as the electronic cash logo) is used at an ATM, a
legal transaction takes place within the single mandate
between the card holder and the card issuer. In
accordance with section 665 of the German Civil Code
(Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch), these mandates comply with
the authority to make a payment from the account of
the card holder:
§ 665 Abweichung von Weisungen
Der Beauftragte ist berechtigt, von den Weisungen
des Auftraggebers abzuweichen, wenn er den
Umständen nach annehmen darf, dass der
Auftraggeber bei Kenntnis der Sachlage die
Abweichung billigen würde. Der Beauftragte hat vor
der Abweichung dem Auftraggeber Anzeige zu
machen und dessen Entschließung abzuwarten, wenn
nicht mit dem Aufschub Gefahr verbunden ist.
Section 66547
Deviation from instructions
The mandatary is entitled to deviate from the
instructions of the mandator if he may assume in the
circumstances that the mandator would approve of
such deviation if he were aware of the factual
situation. The mandatary must make notification to
the mandator prior to such deviation and must wait
for the decision of the latter unless postponement
entails danger.
The EC card is a payment (debit) card, in accordance
with the provisions of section 676h of the German Civil
Code. Subsequently, the card issuing bank is entitled to
demand reimbursement of expenses for use of a
payment card only where it was not abused by a third
party. Apart from the possibility of excluding claims for
expenses, there still remain the card issuer’s claims for
damages against the card holder, in accordance with the
general regulations (sections 280 and 281 of the
German Civil Code).
Risks associated with the PIN 
Methods to detect the PIN
As the result of the experience with ATM systems at the
time of writing,8 it is known that taking cash out of a
bank account at ATMs is much safer than relying on the
cheque guarantee card system.9 Experienced criminals
can forge a signature in such a way that the average
recipient of a cheque cannot discover the deception.10
An unauthorized withdrawal using the correct PIN is a
forgery, although it follows that the PIN itself can be
only correct or incorrect. Card issuers fail to understand
this logic, and therefore it is incorrectly assumed that
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6 The agreement was concluded between the
Federal Association of the German Volksbanken
and Raiffeisenbanken, the Federal Association of
the German Banks, the German Sparkassen- and
Giroverband as well as the Federal Association of
Public Banks of Germany (all of them incorporated
societies), in force from 1 December 2003; see
Karsten Schmidt, Zu E. Bankkartenverfahren; 1.
Vereinbarung über das deutsche ec-
Geldautomatensystem, in: Münchener Kommentar
zum HGB (Handelsgesetzbuch is the Commercial
Code), 2nd edition, (beck on-line, 2009).
7 Translation taken from http://bundesrecht.juris.de/
englisch_bgb/index.html.
8 The history of the eurocheque system is covered in
Ewald Judt and Alfred Scholz, 35 Jahre
Geldausgabeautomat – 20 Jahre Bankomat in
Österreich, ÖBA (2000) 839.
9 For contributions that deal with the advantages
and disadvantages of the eurocheque system, see
Ewald Judt, Der eurocheque: 1968 – 2001 – ein
Nachtrag, ÖBA (2003) 136; fundamentally Gerwin
Haybäck, Zur Risikoverteilung bei
Euroscheckfälschung, ÖBA (1997) 251.
10 Michael Bucher, Die Risikoverteilung bei der
Benutzung elektronischer kartengesteuerter
Zahlungssysteme, (P. Lang, 1992), 180; Günter H.
Roth, Grundriß des österreichischen
Wertpapierrechts, Wien: Manz, 2nd edition (1999)
85 and following: checking the signature on forged
EC cheques.
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the card holder has a duty of care to prevent the passing
of the PIN to third persons. Where a third person
obtains the PIN, it is assumed that the card holder has
been engaged in careless behaviour, despite the ease
by which a PIN can be obtained by a third person. The
PIN is the most important identifier of the (authorized)
card holder at ATMs and POS terminals. Card holders
are contractually bound to keep the PIN safe, and are
not entitled to inform anybody voluntarily of the PIN.11
This requires a discussion as to how a third person is
able to detect the correct PIN. The three most frequent
causes are breach of secrecy, spying to obtain the PIN,
and guessing the PIN.
Breach of secrecy
The card holder has a contractual duty to take care of
their card and PIN. The issue is to establish what those
duties might be. Both the prevailing opinion as well as
the conditions for the use of the Maestro Card oblige
the card holder to keep his PIN confidential and never
pass the PIN to others.12 In particular, the PIN must not
be noted on the card or otherwise stored together with
it, even in an altered form.13 Should the card holder keep
the Maestro card and code close together, they
undermine an important component of the Maestro
safety system.14
In 1999, it was held by the Local Court in Hamburg
that keeping the EC card in the hip pocket of a pair of
trousers (without carrying the secret number) was not
regarded a grossly negligent violation of the duty to
care.15 ‘Saving the EC components separately’16 means
keeping them in different boxes, pieces of furniture and
locked drawers,17 or in different pockets of items of
clothing.18
The Local Court in Kassel has determined that it is
extremely careless behaviour to keep a note of the PIN
in an address book together with the ATM card.19 Such
behaviour is in conflict with the strict duty of secrecy
stipulated in the conditions for the use of the Maestro
Card, in accordance with the prevailing case law. This
method of concealing the PIN is well-known by
criminals.20 However, in the opinion of Professor Udo
Reifner, such behaviour cannot be considered
unreasonable. It is usual for a person to make a
permanent record of the PIN for the purposes of an aid
to memory. Further, he also approves the transmission
of the PIN to persons of trust.21
Nevertheless, if the card holder fails to notice the loss
of an ATM card by taking money out or placing money,
account statements, and the ATM card carelessly into
the pocket of a coat or jacket, such behaviour is
considered as grossly negligent, in accordance with a
decision by the District Court at Halle.22
The requirement of isolating the card in a safe is out
of touch with everyday life. On the one hand, the card
holder acts grossly negligently if he is absent for three
or four hours while leaving the card and the PIN on the
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11 In contrast, concerning to the duty of secrecy, the
card holder only has to afford a reasonable, i.e.
conventional duty of care (in German: ‘zumutbar’,
what can be expected of an average card holder).
Full particulars are discussed by Stefan Werner in
Thorwald Hellner and Stephan Steuer (editors),
Bankrecht und Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz 6/1463.
12 Although informing others of the PIN seems to be
practiced in particular between family members,
nevertheless the prevailing opinion is strictly
against any transfer of the PIN, for which see Franz
Häuser and Lutz Haertlein, E.
Bankkartenverfahren, in Münchener Kommentar
zum HGB, 2nd edition, (beck on-line 2009) Rn E 33
and following; likewise Ernst Heymann, Norbert
Horn, and Peter Balzer, Handelsgesetzbuch
(Commercial Code), 2nd edition, (2005) section
372 annex; Adolf Baumbach, Wolfgang Hefermehl,
and Matthias Casper, Wechselgesetz,
Scheckgesetz, Recht der kartengestützten
Zahlungen, 23rd edition (2008) Rn 36; Wolfgang
Gößmann, Aspekte der ec-Karten-Nutzung, WM
(1998) 1264, 1269; Viola Russenschuck, Die
Auszahlung von Bargeld an Automaten nach
deutschem Zivilrecht (2002) 75 and following; for
dissenting views, see Christian Hofmann,
Schadensverteilung bei Missbrauch der ec-Karte,
WM (2005) 441, 444 and Professor Dr. Udo Reifner,
Die Haftung des Kontoinhabers bei Missbrauch
seiner Bankomatkarte durch Dritte, BB 1912, 1918.
13 Stefan Werner, Verantwortlichkeit bei
missbräuchlicher Verwendung der ec-Karte unter
Eingabe der richtigen PIN, BKR (2004) 50.
14 Wolfgang Gößmann, Aspekte der ec-Karten-
Nutzung, WM (1998) 1264, 1269.
15 Local Court Hamburg, VuR (1999) 88.
16 BGH WM (2000) 2421, 2422.
17 Wolfgang Gößmann, Aspekte der ec-Karten-
Nutzung, WM (1998) 1269, referring to District
Court Essen, WM (1988) 493 and District Court
Hanau, ZIP (1995) 559.
18 Wolfgang Gößmann, Aspekte der ec-Karten-
Nutzung, WM (1998) 1269, referring to Local Court
Hannover WM (1996) 2013.
19 Local Court Kassel, I D 5. b – 1. 95 WuB, Pfeiffer.
20 Local Court Kassel, WM (1994) 2110; see Stefan
Werner in: Thorwald Hellner and Stephan Steuer
(editors), Bankrecht und Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz
6/1470; Horst Ahlers, Die neuen Bedingungen für
ec-Karten, WM (1995) 601, 607; dissenting
Hartmut Strube, Haftungsrisiken der ec-Karte, WM
(1998) 1210 and following.
21 Professor Dr. Udo Reifner, Die Haftung des
Kontoinhabers bei Missbrauch seiner
Bankomatkarte durch Dritte, BB (1989) 1912 and
following.
22 District Court Halle, WM (2001) 1298.
Where a third person obtains the PIN, it is assumed
that the card holder has been engaged in careless
behaviour, despite the ease by which a PIN can be
obtained by a third person.
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In order to provide for the safety of the maestro system,
the credit services sector promotes the physical shielding
of the front of ATMs, as well as a nationwide development
of video control at each ATM.
Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6 © Pario Communications Limited, 2009
desk in his flat,23 or if he keeps both components in a
folder.24 However, the card holder is entitled to
physically carry the card as well as the PIN. On the other
hand, the PIN must not be written down on the card or
otherwise stored together, to avoid a thief obtaining the
PIN if the card is stolen.
In what is known at the ‘Hospital case’, the court
made high demands on the safe keeping of the card and
PIN. It was determined that keeping the card with the
PIN (camouflaged as a four-digit telephone number)
was a grossly negligent contributory cause that allowed
a third party to obtain unauthorized access to the
account. The card holder was not exculpated by putting
both components (card and code) into a solid strong
box in a locked sick room. It is a matter of fact that a
hospital is considered an unsafe location where the
theft of such items cannot be excluded.25
The cumulative effect of judicial pronouncements
indicates that it is necessary to keep the components
(card and PIN) strictly separated, even in private rooms.
According to a recent judgement of the Federal Court of
Justice of Germany (Bundesgerichtshof, BGH), the
customer does not act grossly negligent if they keep the
card and PIN in different rooms of a flat, and, as a result,
unauthorized, abusive withdrawals follow.26 Within the
domestic arrangements of a family home, it is not
necessary to take measures against theft between
family members where the relationships between family
members are in good order, and if the card issuer does
not request special protective measures to be put in
place caused by any specific circumstances the family
might find themselves in. Examples where the card
issuer might consider that there are special
circumstances that require additional consideration for
security are flat-sharing communities or residential
homes where family members are not present.
In a recent judgment of the Higher Regional Court of
Düsseldorf, it is considered to be grossly negligent if a
purse containing the card is placed in a shopping trolley
in a department store.27
Observing the PIN by third parties
It is possible to differentiate between active and passive
observation of the PIN.28 The most common method is
passive observation, such as looking over someone’s
shoulder, especially at ATMs in busy places or at POS
terminals in supermarkets. Criminals will go to the
length of renting flats across from ATMs for this
purpose. Thus, they take possession of different PINs by
using binoculars, telephoto lens, mini-spy-cameras, or
by transmitting the PIN to an external personal
computer where the ATM has been manipulated by the
criminal to obtain the PIN when the PIN is entered into
the ATM.
In order to provide for the safety of the maestro
system, the credit services sector promotes the physical
shielding of the front of ATMs, as well as a nationwide
development of video control at each ATM.29 On the
other hand, the card holder is obliged to take
reasonable precautions. If the card holder takes cash
out of the bank account at ATMs, or makes payments at
POS terminals, they have to stay away from the next
customer, protect the number pad, and such like.30
It is possible to fabricate a clone of the card and take
cash out of the victim’s bank account at an ATM in a
foreign country if a criminal obtains sufficient
information from the card and knows the correct PIN.
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23 District Court Frankfurt 1. December 1992, 2/13 0I
98/92.
24 Higher Regional Court of Nürnberg WM (1989) 405;
Stefan Werner in Thorwald Hellner and Stephan
Steuer (Ed), Bankrecht und Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz
6/1470.
25 District Court Bonn, NJW-RR (2000) 1415.
26 Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (2001)
286.
27 Higher Regional Court of Düsseldorf, BKR (2008)
41.
28 Professor Dr. Manfred Pausch, Risiken im
automatisierten Verkehr mit Magnetstreifen, VuR
(1997) 121, 124; Professor Dr. Manfred Pausch, Die
Sicherheit von Magnetstreifenkarten im
automatisierten Zahlungsverkehr, CR (1997) 174.
29 Various authors demand an obligation of the
banks to provide an area-wide video control of
ATMs, see Professor Manfred Pausch, Risiken im
automatisierten Verkehr mit Magnetstreifen, VuR
1997, 121 (123); Stefan Werner in Thorwald Hellner
and Stephan Steuer (Ed), Bankrecht und
Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz &/1481.
30 Professor Dr. Manfred Pausch, Risiken im
automatisierten Verkehr mit Magnetstreifen, VuR
(1997) 124; Werner Schindler, Die neuen PIN-
Nummern der ec-Karten, NJW-CoR (1998) 223, 226;
Stefan Werner in Thorwald Hellner and Stephan
Steuer (Ed), Bankrecht und Bankpraxis, (2008) Rz
6/1469.
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31 Manfred Lochter and Werner Schindler, Missbrauch
von PIN-gestützten Transaktionen mit ec- und
Kreditkarten aus Gutachtersicht, MMR (2006) 292,
294. Concerning the risk of forging bank cards in
Austria, see Gerwin Haybäck, Haftungsfragen bei
Totalfälschung der ec-Karte, wbl (1999) 56.
32 District Court Halle, WM (2001) 1298.
33 Local Court Buchen VuR (1998) 42. The risk of
observing the PIN is not mentioned in the
following: District Court Hannover, WM (1998)
1223; Local Court Dinslaken, WM (1998) 1126;
Local Court Osnabrück, WM (1998) 1227; Local
Court Charlottenburg, WM (1998) 1224.
34 Local Court Wildeshausen, WM (1998) 1128; District
Court Bonn, WM (1995) 575; Local Court Frankfurt,
CR (1998) 723.
35 District Court Berlin, ZBB (1999) 85.
36 In German, Dr. Tilman Hoppe, Anscheinsbeweis bei
Ausspähen der PIN, ZBB (1999) 88 (93) proposes:
‘Zunächst sind die Banken wie auch die
Teilnehmer am POS-Verfahren im Handel gehalten,
die Bedingungen bei der Eingabe so zu gestalten,
dass ein Ausspähen nicht möglich ist. Besonders
der Sichtschutz der Eingabetastaturen im Handel
erscheint im Falle unübersichtlichen Gedränges
allzu dürftig. Es wäre dringend zu überlegen, ob im
Handel die Legitimation des Kunden nicht
ausschließlich durch Unterschrift geschehen sollte,
wie bisher schon im sogenannten POZ-Verfahren.’
37 Dr. Tilman Hoppe, Anscheinsbeweis bei Ausspähen
der PIN, ZBB (1999) 88 (93).
38 POZ system means point of sale without guarantee
of payment by using EC card plus a manuscript
signature (without a PIN); Dr. Tilman Hoppe,
Anscheinsbeweis bei Ausspähen der PIN, ZBB
(1999) 93, referring to Ulrich Häde, Die Zahlung mit
Kredit- und Scheckkarten, ZBB (1994) 33, 41.
39 Gerwin Haybäck, Risikohaftung bei
missbräuchlichen Bankomatbehebungen: Ein
österreichisch-deutscher Rechtsvergleich, (2008)
II.D.3, p 96 and following; to EC liability Gerwin
Haybäck, ÖBA (1997) 256 and following.
40 Stating that the former POZ system was ‘highly
susceptibel (in German: “anfällig”) to misuse’:
Wolfgang Gößmann, § 68: ec-Kassen und POS-
System (Point-of-Sale). GeldKarte, in: Herbert
Schimansky, Hermann J. Bunte, and Hans-Jürgen
Lwowski, Bankrechts-Handbuch, Bd 1, 3rd edition
(2007) marginal number 12, 13.
41 Local Court Dortmund, BKR (2003) 912.
The information, but not the PIN, can be obtained from
the magnetic stripe on the reverse of the card. From
1982 on in Germany, detectors for an anti-fraud feature
known as the Moduliertes Merkmal (MM code) began to
be installed in ATMs, in order to provide protection from
cloned cards.31 The MM code consists of two
components, one stored on the magnetic stripe, and
one hidden within the material of the card. The MM
code is verified by the ATM with a cryptographic
operation that is performed to check that the
component of the MM code on the magnetic stripe
corresponds to the one hidden on the card. The correct
hidden component of the MM code cannot be calculated
from the information recorded on the magnetic stripe
alone. It is also necessary to have a cryptographic key,
which is stored in the MM code detection unit. ATMs in
Germany include a special MM detection unit and
sensor to read and verify the MM code, although cash
machine manufacturers are not permitted to obtain
access to or service the unit.
The prevailing case law indicates that it is considered
as grossly negligent behaviour where the customer fails
to realize the loss of the card by taking money out, then
putting the money, account statements, and card into a
coat pocket. The same consequences apply where the
customer does not protect the number pad.32 Generally,
the card holder has to take reasonable care. The mere
fact that the offender knew about the PIN is not
sufficient to prove the card holder’s breach of his duty to
care.33 In other reported cases, the chance of observing
a different secret number is mentioned, but was
excluded in the case under consideration.34 On one
occasion, the District Court in Berlin formally criticized
the lack of safety screening devices. In this case, the
criminals had detected the secret number and
thereupon pursued the card holder through Berlin. In
the view of the court, the card holder is not at fault if
she does not pay attention to people around during the
time it takes to make the withdrawal.35
To this end, Dr. Tilman Hoppe proposes the following:
‘First of all, the banks as well as the participants of the
POS system are requested to redesign the conditions in
such a way that is not possible to spy out the PIN.
Especially, the screen of the key pad at POS terminals in
trade seems inadequate in case of large crowds. It
should be taken into consideration whether the
identification of the customer is carried out as it is the
case with the POZ system.’36 Hoppe draws the
conclusion that the bank is obliged to prove that the
respective ATM is not protected at best. Measures of
improving the shield of the number pad are required,
especially in superstores.37
It is debatable whether Hoppe’s proposal is
acceptable: ‘to deliberate about whether in trade the
identification of the customer should take place as it is
the case with the POZ system.’38 This comment is in
conflict with a long experience in providing for the
security for withdrawals at ATMs in comparison with
those of the eurocheque system. With good cause, the
eurocheque as well as the (former) POZ system were
suspended (in 2001, respectively in 2007), because it
was easy to forge the manuscript signature but
impossible to detect whether the correct secret number,
if used, was used by the card holder, and not an
unauthorized third party. The PIN system is arguably
much more secure than payment instruments using the
signature to authorize the customer, because of the
cryptographic controls in place.39 Since 2006, the credit
services sector has refused to accept the risks of forgery
in connection with the POZ system based on the
manuscript signature of the customer.40
In 2003, the Local Court in Dortmund reached the
conclusion that there is no empirical deduction
providing that the card holder must have caused
unauthorized withdrawals from an ATM in a grossly
negligent way, where they retained the card with the
PIN, or noted the PIN on the card where it was stolen
from a rucksack.41 In contrast to the view of the Higher
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Regional Court of Frankfurt,42 most of the cases show
that obtaining the secret number is not to be considered
as absurd and only a theoretical possibility.
According to a recent decision of the Austrian
Supreme Court (OGH), the card holder is not liable for
withdrawals caused by unauthorized third parties where
he keeps the card and PIN safe. In this case, the card
holder took out 90 Euro from an ATM. When doing so,
he not aware that he was being observed by an
unknown person. The card holder protected the key pad
against observation from behind with the upper part of
his body. After the withdrawal, the customer put the
money and the card into a wallet, and the wallet into the
main pocket of his rucksack, which he then placed on
his back. He was followed by the thief, who stole the
card in the underground. When the card holder noticed
the theft, he initiated the block of the card. However,
310 Euro (the original 90 Euro plus a further withdrawal
of 310 Euro meant the maximum of 400 Euro maximum
was reached because that was the maximum for any
withdrawal a day) were withdrawn by an unauthorized
third person. The Austrian Supreme Court (OGH)
decided that the card holder did not breach his duty of
care. It was determined that he was not obliged to take
additional measures against criminals, such as
protecting the key pad with the second hand or
shielding it from lateral observation. In contrast to the
court of appeal, who considered it as negligent
behaviour because of the fact that the card holder had
worn the rucksack on his back and had therefore lost
the sight of the zip, the Austrian Supreme Court stated
in this case that the safekeeping of the card enclosed in
the main pocket of the card holder’s rucksack was
performed according to his duty to care. As a
consequence, the bank lost the appeal.
As a result, the court drew the conclusion that it is
sufficient to put a purse into a closed rucksack that is
worn on the back, and to protect the number pad with
the upper part of the body, even if the purse and card
disappear from the customer’s sight.43
Guessing or calculating the PIN
At the time of implementation of the ATM PIN system, it
was only considered an academic question whether
unauthorized third parties were able to find out the PIN,
because of the marginal probability of 0,03 per cent.44 It
is generally accepted that the Data Encryption Standard
(DES), which was applied until the end of 1997, was
considered cryptographically secure.45 Randomizing the
code using conventional means was considered
impossible. In 1992, the Higher Regional Court of Berlin
considered the PIN code secure, in reference to
statements of the Federal Office for Security and
Information Technology. Regarding the guessing or
randomizing the PIN code at that time, the Federal
Office acted on the assumption of 72 quadrillion
alternatives.46
However, this judgment was overturned by the rapid
development of the semiconductor technology. In 1994,
experienced criminals would have required 1900 years
to find out a PIN. Three years later, they would only have
needed 96 days, shortly after only 19 days, since 1999
no more than 24 hours.47 Thereafter, a decision of the
Higher Regional Court of Hamm initiated a serious
discussion as well as major doubts about the
cryptographic safety of DES used until the end of 1997.
In this now famous case, the court refused to grant a
prima facie evidence in favour of the bank. It was
possible that the criminal could have decoded the PIN
by using the data recorded on the ATM card. As a
consequence, the customer won the case.48
As a result, the cryptographic system was updated
and replaced by the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
(TDEA). New, regionally generated PINs have been
distributed, and an on-line network has been
established.49 Thus, the credit services sector improved
the safety of the system against external attacks.
Nevertheless, several judgments in favour of the card
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42 Higher Regional Court of Frankfurt, WM (2002)
2101.
43 The ‘Rucksack’ decision of 2 February 2007, in:
ÖBA 2007/1424 (OGH). Consenting Georg Graf, Wer
haftet beim Bankomatkartenmissbrauch?
Anmerkungen zu einem aktuellen OGH-Urteil
sowie den Auswirkungen des Transparenzgebotes
auf die Auslegung von AGB, ÖBA (2007) 531 and
following.
44 The Higher Regional Court of Berlin (German:
Kammergericht), case: WM (1992) 729, relied on a
statement from the Federal Office for Security and
Information Technology (Bundesamt für Sicherheit
in der Informationstechnik) for this figure of the
margin of probability.
45 Concerning the safety of the PIN cp. Manfred
Lochter and Werner Schindler, Missbrauch von PIN-
gestützten Transaktionen mit ec- und Kreditkarten
aus Gutachtersicht, MMR (2006) 292 and
following. Referring to the former DES PIN system,
see the US study at http://csrc.nist.gov/
publications/fips/fips46-3/fips46-3.pdf: A DES key
consists of 64 binary digits (0s or 1s) of which 56
bits are randomly generated and used directly by
the algorithm.
46 Federal Office for Security and Information
Technology (Bundesamt für Sicherheit in der
Informationstechnik). For the judgment mentioned
above, see Higher Regional Court of Berlin, WM
(1992) 729.
47 The detailed report of 19 January 1999 is available
at: http://www.heise.de/tp/deutsch/inhalte/te/
1771/1.html.
48 Higher Regional Court of Hamm, NJW (1997) 1711
and following. To the safety of the former PIN
system, sceptically Professor Dr. Werner Schindler,
Ec-Karten: Wie sicher ist die PIN-Nummer?, NJW-
CoR (1997) 284; Hans-Jürgen Stenger, Zur Kritik an
der Annahme einer Errechenbarkeit einer PIN, CoR
(1997) 363 and following.
49 Hartmut Strube, Haftungsrisiken der ec-Karte, WM
1210 (1998). In respect of the question of the safety
of the PIN, see Johannes Köndgen, Die
Entwicklung des privaten Bankrechts in den Jahren
1999-2003, NJW (2004) 1288.
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50 Local Court Hamburg, VuR (1999) 88; Local Court
Frankfurt, WM (1999) 1922; Higher Regional Court
of Stuttgart, NJW-RR (2002) 1274.
51 Local Court Duisburg, JurPC Web-Dok (1999) 197,
Abs 1 – 15; cracking the RSA-155-Code, see
http://igw.tuwien.ac.at/fit/2001/fit05/sicherheit/der
_rsa_algorithmus.html.
52 District Court Stuttgart, WM (1999) 1934; Local
Court Dinslaken, WM (1998) 1126, referring to:
Local Court Hannover, WM (1997) 1207; Local Court
Wuppertal, WM (1997) 1209, against Higher
Regional Court of Hamm, NJW (1997) 1711. Likewise
the side proceeding of this case, see District Court
Darmstadt VuR (2000) 357; Rolf Aepfelbach and
Gerd Cimiotti, Zur Sicherheit des ec-Kartensystems,
WM (1998) 1218 and following.
53 The Federal Office for Security and Information
Technology considered the possibility of switching
off the ‘faulty operation counting function’ in the
card by technical manipulation as an ‘annoying
issue’, for which see Werner Schindler, Die neuen
PIN-Nummern der ec-Karten, NJW-CoR (1998) 223,
224.
54 Stefan Werner, Anscheinsbeweis und Sicherheit
des ec-PIN-Systems im Lichte der neuen
Rechtsprechung, WM (1997) 1516.
55 Local Court Frankfurt, NJW (1998) 687; Local Court
Osnabrück, WM (1998) 1127.
56 Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (2004)
3623; expressively confirmed two years later,
Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (2007)
593.
57 Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (1996)
1828; (1997) 528. Taking of evidence in the view of
the experts, cp. Manfred Lochter and Werner
Schindler, Missbrauch von PIN-gestützten
Transaktionen mit ec- und Kreditkarten aus
Gutachtersicht, MMR (2006) 297.
58 District Court Köln, WM (1995) 976; Local Court
Diepholz, WM (1995) 1919; Local Court
Schöneberg, WM (1997) 55; Local Court Hannover,
WM (1997) 64; Local Court Frankfurt, WM (1995)
880; Local Court Wuppertal, WM (1997) 1209; Local
Court Hannover, WM (1997) 1207; Local Court
Charlottenburg, WM (1997) 2082; Stefan Werner,
Beweislastverteilung und Haftungsrisiken im
elektronischen Zahlungsverkehr, MMR (1998) 232
and following; Wolfgang Gößmann, Aspekte der
ec-Karten-Nutzung, WM (1998) 1269.
59 Dr. Tilman Hoppe, Anscheinsbeweis bei Ausspähen
der PIN, ZBB (1999) 89; BGH NJW (1979) 1964;
BGH WM (1979) 417.
holder were delivered.50 For example, the Local Court at
Duisburg reached the conclusion that PIN codes could
be decoded by ordinary card readers. Even the RSA-155-
Code (512-bit numbers in the code have about 155
decimals) used in internet transactions (SSL protocol)
was cracked. Although it is admitted that some
withdrawals at ATMs are performed by using stolen
payment cards, this does not necessarily imply grossly
negligent behaviour on the part of the customer.51
On the other hand, there are still decisions in favour
of the prima facie evidence of ATM withdrawals that
either the card holder has withdrawn the money, or he
has not kept the secret number safe.52 The Higher
Regional Court of Hamm mentioned several methods of
manipulation, such as card reader, frequency of certain
number combinations, switching off the ‘faulty
operation counting function’ in the card by technical
manipulation,53 and others. However, in Germany, off-
line systems have not been in use since 1997.54 From
that time on, the prima facie evidence could not be
countered by the possibility that criminals discovered
the PIN.55 The Federal Court of Justice of Germany felt
confident that the security architecture of the Triple
Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) system practiced
since 1997 is safe. For this reason, the court has
imposed significant demands on the customer
whenever the latter has attempted to counter the prima
facie evidence in favour of the bank.56
Prima facie evidence in favour of the bank – a
controversial issue
In contrast to other payment instruments, such as the
cheque, specific problems of evidence arise from the
ATM PIN system, because of the anonymous
communication process. If it is impossible to find out
who executed the withdrawal at issue, it is necessary to
begin the investigation with what is meant by a legally
performed electronic payment process. If the bank was
legally obliged to furnish full proof, it would result in
insoluble difficulties.
The prevailing judicial opinion is that the prima facie
evidence is granted in favour of the bank. This is proper
evidence which is equated to formal evidence. The
prima facie evidence comes into action in case of formal
and typical events. According to experience, the
circumstances of the case must either indicate only one
cause or one definite process.57 Exercising prima facie
evidence is based on the assertion that the decoding of
the PIN is impossible at short notice. The prima facie
evidence rests upon the mutable experience of life, as
well as technological progress.
Therefore, the use of the EC (ATM) card in connection
with the PIN establishes the ground for prima facie
evidence that either the card holder himself withdrew
the respective amount at the ATM, or enabled the
unauthorized withdrawal by grossly negligent
behaviour.58 Regarding unauthorized transactions
caused by third parties, the customer is required to
report abnormal events described in a plausible,
precise, and substantial manner, should he intend to
counter the prima facie evidence. In accordance with the
provisions of section 670 of the German Civil Code, only
where the customer succeeds in reporting such
evidence in substance, will a claim for disbursement not
be granted to the bank:59
§ 670 Ersatz von Aufwendungen
Macht der Beauftragte zum Zwecke der Ausführung
des Auftrags Aufwendungen, die er den Umständen
nach für erforderlich halten darf, so ist der
Auftraggeber zum Ersatz verpflichtet.
Section 670
Reimbursement of expenses
If the mandatory, for the purpose of performing the
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mandate, incurs expenses that he may consider to be
necessary in the circumstances, then the mandator is
obliged to make reimbursement.
This may be the case if the card holder has
demonstrably not been at the place of the events (that
is, at the physical location of the unauthorized
withdrawal at the ATM or POS terminal) at the time in
question; if the ATM card was lost before the
withdrawal; if a video recording suggests another
conclusion, or if fingerprints on the retracted card are
not those of the customer, or a manipulated faulty
operation counter are detectable.60
Further, the ATM journal is of importance. The case
law indicates that the correct documentation of a single
payment by the ATM journal tape is considered as prima
facie evidence that the ATM has paid out money in the
amount of the documented sum.61 In case an ATM does
not dispense money at all or dispenses out too little,
this may be a fault that is documented by the ATM
journal. Time, place, sum, denomination, and data input
are documented exactly, although it is possible but
rather difficult to destroy the data of the ATM journal.
The authenticity of a card is checked by the modulated
feature (MM-Modul) in the ATM corresponding with the
chip on the card. The module on the card is read by the
bank, and data is exchanged between the card and the
bank, and if this data is accepted by the bank, it
provides sufficient evidence to the satisfaction of the
bank to infer that the customer’s card is physically in
the ATM. This evidence is considered to be prima facie
evidence that the customer’s card was inserted in the
ATM, and acts to demonstrate that a third person cannot
have inserted a duplicate EC card in the terminal.
Given such evidence, it is for the customer to verify
why atypical events are to be taken into consideration.62
The jurisprudence concerning the prima facie evidence
makes clear that, regarding electronic means of
payment, there is a close connection of prima facie
evidence and system security.63 If prima facie evidence is
to be accepted lawfully, it is necessary to assume the
security of the system is functioning correctly.
The customer cannot merely carry out his duty to
report the theft of a card and any subsequent misuse as
a matter of fact. He is also required to make clear what
the abnormal events are, and to described them.64 As
mentioned above, the Higher Regional Court of Hamm
did not grant a prima facie evidence to the bank in
1997.65 The court did not exclude the possibility that an
unauthorized third person could have been able to find
out the PIN by guessing or calculating it. This judgment
is now in the minority, because it acts on the
assumption that only the card holder knew the correct
PIN, and the use of the correct PIN was not sufficient to
prove the card holder’s breach of his duty of care.66
Position of the Federal Court of Justice (BGH) and
subsequent case law 
Thereafter, the Federal Court of Justice of Germany
decided a case in favour of the bank, in which a third
person having stolen the payment card took 1000 Euro
out of the ATM.67 Considering the application of the 128
bit Triple Data Encryption Algorithm (TDEA) in 1997, the
prima facie evidence suggested the fact that the thief
noticed the PIN only because the card holder was
negligent by keeping the secret number together with
the ATM card. It was concluded that the claimant must
have violated her duty of care by having recorded the
PIN on the card or stored the latter together with the
PIN. The Federal Court of Justice of Germany refused the
alternative explanation of decoding the PIN, because
this would be mathematically impossible. Although at
the time of this case, there was no evidence put forward
to indicate the code had been cracked. In the view of
the court, purely theoretical possibilities to find out the
PIN are not sufficiently suitable to disable the prima
facie evidence. The result means there is no reason to
obtain evidence regarding the system security.
Obtaining the PIN by observation is only considered as
a ‘different’ cause where the card is stolen in close
connection with the respective ATM, at the same time
the PIN was entered. In this instance, the card holder
was not able to substantiate such circumstances.
In the view of Stefan Werner, the Federal Court of
CIVIL LAW LIABILITY FOR UNAUTHORIZED WITHDRAWALS AT ATMS IN GERMANY
60 Michael Bucher, Die Risikoverteilung bei der
Benutzung elektronischer kartengesteuerter
Zahlungssysteme, (Verlag P. Lang, 1992), 302.
61 Herbert Schimansky, Hermann-Josef Bunte and
Hans-Jürgen Lwowski, Bankrechts-Handbuch, (3rd
edition, Verlag C. H. Beck München, 2007), 13-14.




63 Stefan Werner, Beweislastverteilung und
Haftungsrisiken im elektronischen
Zahlungsverkehr, MMR (1998) 234 and following.
64 Local Court Schöneberg, WM 66 (1997); Local
Court Hannover, WM 64 (1997); Local Court
Wuppertal, WM 1209 (1997); District Court
Hannover, WM 1123 (1998); District Court Bonn,
NJW-RR 815 (1995). In general Wolfgang Gößmann,
Aspekte der ec-Karten-Nutzung, WM (1998) 1270.
65 OLG Hamm, NJW (1997) 1711.
66 Local Court Buchen, VuR (1998) 98; similiar District
Court Frankfurt, VuR (1997) 423; District Court
Frankfurt, VuR (1998) 162; District Court Dortmund,
CR (1999) 556. Against it, the bank won the case,
because the customer did not succeed in
demonstrating the practical alternative of guessing
or randomizing the PIN, Local Court Flensburg, VuR
(2000) 131. Likewise: District Court Köln, WM
(2001) 852.
67 Federal Court of Justice of Germany, NJW (2004)
3623; consenting Jan Christian Eggers and Andreas
Goerth, Die Haftung des Bankkunden für
unbefugte Abhebungen mittels ec-Karte und PIN –
BGH, NJW (2004) 3623; BGH JuS (2005) 492.
65© Pario Communications Limited, 2009 Digital Evidence and Electronic Signature Law Review, Vol 6
The correlation between the theft of the card and the
unauthorized withdrawals as mentioned by the Federal
Court of Justice is somewhat ambiguous.
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256.
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27.11.2008 COM (2008) 794 final; Georg E. Kodek,
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Grünbuch der EU, ecolex (2009) 185.
73 Consumer Advice Centre of Nordrhein-Westfalen
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74 Federal Court of Justice of Germany: NJW (2007)
593, 595 et seq. Likewise: Higher Regional Court of
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Justice stated that, at least if a card and PIN are used
promptly at an ATM, the prima facie evidence argues for
the fact that the card holder has noted the PIN on the
card or stored it with the card. Certainly, this argument
only applies if different causes regarding the misuse can
be excluded, according to the experience of life.68 This
judgement was criticized by Christian Hofmann
inasmuch as it has ‘discharged the bank from
responsibility although the bank is able to battle
against failure of the payment system.’69 Rightly, the
Institute of Financial Services (Hamburg) emphasized
the significant problems for the customer to counter the
prima facie evidence under the prevailing
circumstances.70
The correlation between the theft of the card and the
unauthorized withdrawals as mentioned by the Federal
Court of Justice is somewhat ambiguous. The prima
facie evidence is granted to the bank at the expense of
the card holder where the PIN is entered and at the first
attempt at withdrawal succeeds within one hour after
the theft of the card. This time is short, hence the
explanation that the thief was able to decode the PIN by
using technical instruments is excluded.71
The Federal Court of Justice of Germany confirmed the
prevailing case law in a class action72 initiated by a
consumer advice centre.73 In this case, a number of
consumer claims of card holders were transferred to the
Consumer Advice Centre of Nordrhein-Westfalen. By
transferring the minor claims of 19 participants, a total
of 13,500 Euro was claimed, due to cards being used by
unauthorized third parties. The Federal Court of Justice
decided that the Advice Centre of Nordrhein-Westfalen
was a rightful claimant. In the interests of the consumer
as well as for the public benefit, the judicial assignment
for collection was considered to be necessary because it
produces a more effective enforcement than any
individual action. This is the case if there are
circumstances preventing a person with the right to
initiate an action, for example in the case of
disproportionately high costs of the proceedings, or a
high risk of litigation, or of practical problems of law
enforcement.74
In this decision, the Federal Court of Justice confirmed
the previous case law concerning the distribution of the
burden of proof in case of misuse of stolen EC cards.
The alternative of observing the PIN by a third party as a
‘different’ cause that only comes into question if the EC
card was stolen and where it can be shown that it
coincided with entering the PIN by the card holder at an
ATM or POS terminal. The court convincingly
emphasized the limits of the prima facie evidence. It is
not possible for a customer to challenge a bank
effectively until the safety standard of the electronic
payment system is no longer granted to be authentic or
genuine.
Conclusion
The distribution of risks between the EC card holder and
the bank in case of unauthorized withdrawals at ATMs
or POS terminals caused by third parties is closely
connected with the safety standard of the electronic
payment system. Despite the prevailing assertions of
the safety of the system, courts always have to question
if the current system grants a sufficient safety standard
in order to apply the prima facie evidence in favour of
the bank.
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Further improvements to the security architecture of
ATMs and POS terminals should be achieved. This
refers, for example, to an effective shielding of the
number pads, video control, increased program code
and internet safety. The traditional magnet strips have
to be replaced by highly effective computer chips. It is
time for a world-wide improvement and the introduction
of a secondary form of authentication, such as a
biometric measurement of the fingerprint or other
biometric measurements, such as user authorization
with an iris scan.75 For this purpose, several appropriate
projects, such as ‘FairPay’, are provided by the German
Research Centre for Artificial Intelligence.76 To this end,
banks, software developers as well as university
departments dealing with the internet and safety
technology, should work together.77
The costs may be high – but safety, particularly in the
electronic age, is worth its price, especially if it
ameliorates the anguish and suffering that people have
to go through when money is taken from their bank
account with authority.
© Gerwin Haybäck, 2009
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Technological progress over the last two decades,
in combination with the opening up of
international borders across the internet that has
further developed human and commercial
relations, have led to the appearance of new
payment systems in the form of bank cards. These
instruments may be used at commercial shopping
centres, at the network of cash dispensers, and
now, with the development of telecommunications
networks, in the context of the internet. The mass
use of cards as a means of payment inevitably
gives rise to a significant amount of fraud. The
legal treatment of fraud under criminal law
involving bank cards requires penalties to be set
for the ways in which these categories of offenses
may be committed, and which may be applied
under these circumstances: conventional fraud,
computer fraud and burglary or housebreaking.
Introduction
At present, electronic telecommunication networks may
also be applied to payment systems. These
technological advances mean that the most extensively
used are the multiple versions of the bank card. The
dynamics of economic globalization will, in turn, expand
modern payment systems even further.
Naturally, as an effective instrument in commercial
relations, the new payments systems are subject to a
more or less complete set of legal regulations, which in
certain situations requires the implementation of
criminal legislation. For such legislation to be effective,
it is essential to study and to define the elements that
constitute the offences that may be applied to these still
relatively novel acts. This article considers the issues
relating to the fraudulent use of bank cards, because of
the scale of their use – it is significant and the most
widely used means of payment, even greater than cash
payments – and their specific regulation.
As this article will demonstrate (and the work that this
article is taken from), there is no specific provision in
Spanish criminal law relating to the use of bank cards as
a means of payment, except in the case of
misrepresentation. As a means of payment in a criminal
context, it is necessary to distinguish between the use
of the bank card at commercial establishments, for
payment over telecommunications networks, and card
abuse at automatic cash dispensers (ATM). Finally, the
fraudulent use of banks cards can imply the application
of some types of criminal offence related to
misrepresentation.
Payment in person at commercial premises 
In this part, cases are considered in which a card held in
the name of an individual is used without that person’s
consent as a means of payment at a commercial
establishment from which a product or service is
acquired, in such a way that the salesperson accepts
the payment under the belief that the real card holder is
in fact present. Doctrine2 and jurisprudence3 has
implicitly equated this method of impersonation with
the conventional offence of fraud, as regulated under
article 248.1 of the Codigo Penal (Penal Code), which
states that:
Cometen estafa los que, con ánimo de lucro, utilizaren
engaño bastante para producir error en otro,
induciéndolo a realizar un acto de disposición en
perjuicio propio o ajeno.
Fraud is committed by whoever, for personal benefit,
1 This paper forms part of the research into
Electronic means of payment - Proyectos de
Investigación sobre Medios electrónicos de pago
VA111/04 (Programa General de Apoyo a Proyectos
de Investigación de la Junta de Castilla y león) and
SEJ2004-03704 (Planes Nacionales I+D/I+D+I, del
Ministerio de Educación y Ciencia). Abbreviations
(where used): CP: Código Penal/Penal Code; LOPJ:
Ley Orgánica del Poder Judicial/Organic Law on
Judicial Power; TS: Tribunal Supremo/Supreme
Court; STS: Sentencia del Tribunal
Supremo/Judgment of the Supreme Court; ATS:
Auto del Tribunal Supremo/Order of the Supreme
Court; SAP: Sentencia de la Audiencia
Provincial/Judgment of the Provincial Court; RJ:
Aranzadi (Repertorio de Jurisprudencia del
TS)/Collection of Supreme Court Jurisprudence;
ROJ: Repertorio Oficial de Jurisprudencia/Official
Collection of Jurisprudence; CENDOJ: Centro de
Documentación Judicial. Consejo General del Poder
Judicial/Centre for Judicial Documentation General
Council of Judicial Power; RGDP: Revista General
del Derecho Penal/General Journal of Criminal Law.
2 Jesús Fernández Entralgo, ‘Falsificación y
utilización fraudulenta de tarjetas electrónicas’ in
Tarjetas bancarias y Derecho penal. Cuadernos de
Derecho Judicial, VI-2002, 58.
3 See, amongst others, STS of 30-10-2003 -La Ley
Juris 2004,10845-; STS 21-1-2003 La Ley Juris 2003,
1269-. 
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practices sufficient deceit to the extent that they
mislead another, inducing the latter person to make
an act of disposal to his own detriment or to that of a
third party.4
Criminal deception under Spanish law requires, in the
first place, deceitful conduct on the part of the offender
(in this case the presentation of a card thereby affirming
both an apparent ability to pay and sufficient solvency).
The deceit practiced by the active subject must be
sufficient to lead another party to be misled (the seller
is misled into thinking that they are dealing with the
person to whom the card was issued, and trusts in the
solvency of the legitimate card holder, but is not in fact
dealing with the person to whom the card was issued).
The erroneous situation in which the other party is
placed leads to an act of disposal (the transfer of goods
or the provision of services by whoever receives the
payment), which causes a loss for that person or for a
third party (the seller, the card issuer or the card holder,
according to whoever is liable to cover the costs of the
amount that is defrauded). From the subjective point of
view, the offender must act with an economic interest in
mind and with the sole aim of personal enrichment.
In recent years, it has also been made clear that there
is an obligation on the receiver of the payment to
comply with certain procedures when accepting
payment. From the perspective of the need for ‘engaño
bastante (sufficient deceit)’ in the description of the
offence, and in accordance with the general
prerequisites of the modern principle of objective
accusation, it is necessary that certain self-protection
procedures be complied with in carrying out the
payment correctly.5 In cases where the card is presented
as a form of payment at a commercial establishment,
the basic procedure requires that the seller satisfy
themselves that the person in possession of the card is
the person to whom the card was issued, and should
also check the expiry date of the card.
This tendency has been accepted in modern
jurisprudence, which has consistently failed to apply the
legal definition of fraud and has punished the offence,
where applicable, solely as misrepresentation, under
circumstances in which the victim of the deceit failed to
act with due diligence that is expected in commercial
practice when verifying the identity of the subject. A
good example of the approach taken by the judiciary is
the STS of 3 June, 2003,6 which declared as abnormal
the act of paying with a stolen bank card belonging to a
person of the opposite sex, because the sales person
made no effort to verify the identity of the card holder,
not even to establish whether the person that presented
the card was a man or a women, such that the deceit
could not be qualified as sufficient to be held as a
causal factor that helped to cause the economic
transfer.7
As well as conventional fraud, the offence of
misrepresentation of a commercial document (article
392 of the CP) may be considered, where the
manuscript signature of the actual card holder is forged
by another person on the sales receipt issued by the
bank card reader. Similarities will occur between both
categories of criminal offence. As much is established in
the Agreement of the 2nd Chamber of the Supreme
Court (Sala 2ª del Tribunal Supremo) dated 18 July 2007,
subsequently applied in the Judgment of 19 July 2007
(nº 451/2007), in which the accused, a Romanian
national, entered a jeweller’s shop in the locality of
4 The penalty established for the crime of
conventional fraud ranges from a six-month to a
three-year prison term (article 249). This same
penalty also applies to computer fraud.
5 Jesús María Silva Sánchez in Pablo Salvador
Coderch and Jesús María Silva Sánchez Simulación
y deberes de veracidad, (Civitas, Madrid, 1999), 98
and following, 387; Francisco Muñoz Conde, ‘De la
llamada estafa de crédito’ in RGDP 9, 2008, Iustel,
2 and following; Mercedes Pérez Manzano, ‘Acerca
de la imputación objetiva de la estafa’, in Hacia un
Derecho penal económico europeo. Jornadas en
honor del Profesor Klaus Tiedemann, (BOE, Madrid
1995), 285 and following.
6 Nº 807/2003 Actualidad Penal. Nº43. 17 - 23
November 2003, 2310 and following. Along the
same lines, supported by the same judgment, the
SAP of Barcelona of 25 January 2007, which deals
with practically identical circumstances (a card
bearing the name of a woman fraudulently used by
a man).
7 The failure to notice the gender of a person reflects
on the accuracy of the observations about the
accuracy of a manuscript signature, as noted in
Stephen Mason, Electronic Signatures in Law, (2nd
edition, Tottel, 2007), 1.2, footnote 1.
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8 A detailed presentation may be found in M. L.
Gutierrez Francés, Fraude informático y estafa
(Ministry of Justice 1991), 336 and following, and
Ricardo M. Mata y Martín Los delitos de estafa
convencional, esstafa informática y robo en el
ámbito de los medios electrónicos de pago, 57.
Jurisprudentially, STS nº 533/2007 of 12 June Id
Cendoj: 28079120012007100455: and STS
369/2007 of 9 of May Id Cendoj:
28079120012007100374.
9 C.M. Romeo Casabona, Poder informático y
seguridad jurídica, (Madrid 1987),  47.
10 ARP 2006/43.
Tavernes Blanques (Valencia) where she made
purchases to a value of 1,399 euro and 860 euro, paying
for these purchases with the credit card of another
person. To do so, she presented the Swiss National
Identity Card of the legitimate holder of the credit card,
but which bore the photograph of the accused.
Subsequently, the accused signed the sales receipts
imitating the signature of the legitimate cardholder. This
decision followed and endorsed the comments made in
earlier judgments made by the same judicial organ.
However, if the card reader finally fails to authorize the
attempted payment once the card had been swiped and
in such a way that the perpetrator was finally unable to
sign the sales ticket, it would amount to an attempt to
falsify a commercial document (STS 25-6-98 nº
882/98). In the 1998 judgment, (STS 882/1998 25
June), the following ruling was made where the accused
entered a jeweller’s shop in Barcelona, and expressed
an interest in buying a watch. To pay for it, the accused
handed over a Master Card to the sales assistant in the
name of a United States citizen, together with the
legitimate passport of the US citizen. The accused had
replaced the photograph of the passport holder with his
own photograph. When the sales assistant requested
authorization from the bank, it was refused via the POS
(Point-of-Sale) terminal. The accused did not, therefore,
place a false signature on the sales ticket. In view of the
above, the accused handed over a second card (Visa),
which had been cloned, which enabled him to pay for
the watch. With respect to the first card, the Supreme
Court considered it as an attempted misrepresentation
of a commercial document.
As regards aiding and abetting misrepresentation, the
TS has made it clear that where more than one person
practices deceit in a commercial outlet by purchasing
goods or services with another person’s card, it does
not matter which of those accused actually signs the
sales slips; they are all guilty of misrepresentation,
because the offence does not solely consist of having
signed the sales receipt. Thus, the guilty parties are all
those who benefit from the proceeds of the crime where
there is a joint decision to commit the crime (STS de 26-
5-2002 nº 661/02).
The bank card and remote payments 
As the technical possibility of making remote payments
with cards became more widely used without the need
for the physical presence of the card holder, certain
problems have arisen that have affected the law.
Electronic procedures, especially over the internet, have
facilitated remote commercial transactions that are
normally settled with payment made by means of the
electronic transfer of the data stored on a card.
The prevailing jurisprudence provides that the deceit
at the heart of criminal deception is necessarily of a
personal nature. It may only arise as the result of a
direct relation between two people. Likewise, the error
must also be a consequence of the deceitful act being of
a psychological nature, which is only possible where
there is close personal proximity.8 Due to these
assumptions, classic or conventional estafa (fraud) is, in
such circumstances, impossible. Thus, when the new
Penal Code was approved in 1995, the legislator
included a different set of circumstances for computer-
aided criminal deception (article 248.2). Given the
personal nature of deceit and error under Spanish law,
no references were made to them in article 248.2. In
their place, it was provided that there must be a
prerequisite of manipulating computer data. The subject
must achieve the unauthorized disposal of an asset
through the manipulation of computer data. Property
assets are thus construed as objects, the manipulation
of which will affect their value in such a way as
eventually to cause loss to the property of a third party.
The transfer implies that accountable assets pass
initially to the property of the offender, and that the
effect is to cause actual loss.
The offence of electronic fraud describes the
circumstances relating to fraudulent payments made
over the internet, in which the offender uses a cloned
card or the information obtained from a legitimate card
to obtain goods or services using the card details of
another person, thereby causing an innocent person to
be charged for the payment. The broad concept of
computer manipulation basically corresponds to that
proposed by Romeo,9 in the sense of a wrongful
modification of the result of an automated process at
any of the stages of computer processing or
programming with the aim of personal benefit and
causing loss to a third party.
An alternative to this broad concept of computer
manipulation has arisen with the Judgement of Malaga
Criminal Court nº 3 of 19th December, 2005.10 The court
excluded the input of inappropriate data into the
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information system as an element of electronic fraud.
The case refers to acts in which the defendants:
… puestos previamente de común acuerdo en fecha
28 de noviembre del 2000 a través de la página
www.tododvd.com de la empresa Red Fénix Sistemas,
SL realizaron el pedido de un reproductor de DVD
marca Pionner modelo 530/535 con precio de venta
438 ? a nombre de Luis Pedro, ... y realizando el pago
con la tarjeta VISA núm. NUM006, de la que era titular
un tercero ajeno a los hechos, quien no había
autorizado a los acusados a utilizarla.
… having previously come to a common accord on
28th November 2000, they placed an order in the
name of Luis Pedro… on the Red Fénix website
www.tododvd.com for a Pioneer brand DVD player
model 530/535 at a sale price of €438 and made
payment for it with a VISA card number NUM006,
which belonged to a third party unconnected with the
facts, who had not authorised its use by the accused.
The court only considered the subject-matter of this
form of fraud in terms of the actions affecting the
existing data (alteration, modification, deletion) in the
system, and not the fact that the data provided,
although correct, was not provided with the authority or
agreement of the actual person whose data was used:
Por ello no cabe incluir la conducta de los acusados
en el párrafo segundo del art. 248 del Código Penal
pues los mismos no manipularon sistema o programa
informático alguno sino cuando se les solicita el
número de una tarjeta bancaria para cargar en la
cuenta asociada a la misma el importe de la compra
efectuada designan el número de una tarjeta de la
que no es titular ninguno de los acusados y es en la
creencia de que todos los datos introducidos en la
página web al hacer el pedido del reproductor de DVD
son correctos por lo que la empresa Red Fénix SL,
procede a hacer la entrega de dicho aparato en el
domicilio indicado al hacer el pedido.
It is for this reason that the conduct of the defendants
is not to be included in the second paragraph of art.
248 of the Penal Code, as the latter did not
manipulate the system or the computer programme in
any way, but when they were asked for the number of
a bank card against which to charge the said amount
to the associated bank account, they inputted the
number of a card that was not held in any of their
names. It was in the belief that all the correct data
was inputted into the web page when the order for
the DVD player was placed that led the firm Red Fénix
SL to proceed with the dispatch of the said device to
the address they specified when the order was
placed.
Were such a distinction to be upheld, all such conduct
involving the introduction of misappropriated data to
make purchases over the internet would be excluded
from the category of computer fraud, offences which
even today are being punished under that criminal
category, as applied by the Supreme Court. Thus, STS of
20.11.2001 points out that computer manipulation:
bien puede consistir en la alteración de los elementos
físicos, de aquellos que permiten su programación o
por la introducción de datos falsos
may either consist in the alteration of physical
elements, or of those that allow it to be programmed
or by inputting false data.
To date, the jurisprudence has only dealt with
circumstances referring to the use of credit cards and
bank passwords, although in the case of on-line
banking, there are no decisions, or at least none that
the authors have found, that refer to payment by mobile
telephone and what is known as electronic money. Thus,
for example, the Judgment of the Provincial Court of the
Balearic Islands num. 30/2005 (Section 2º) of 14 of April
2005, convicted a person for computer or electronic
fraud that used personal passwords without the
authorization of the account holder to make multiple
transfers using the Línea Oberta de la Caixa website to
accounts held by the banks of Banesto and La Caixa.
A peculiarity arises in this field, with regard to
electronic fraud in association with a commercial outlet.
It is a question of the circumstances under which the
offender in various ways manages to persuade the
owner or employee of an outlet to facilitate an irregular
payment. Normally, the offer involves a half share of the
benefits obtained from the sales in exchange for
collaboration. This circumstance is dealt with, for
example, in STS num. 2175/ 2001 of 20 November 2001.
Specifically, it refers to an employee of a firm who was
responsible for sending out credit cards to their owners
and who appropriated a card and proceeded to a sales
outlet, where, according to the testimony of the sales
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11 See also STS of 26 June 2006 (RJ 2006, 4925). At
the Provincial Court level, similar criminal
behaviour to those set out here may be
appreciated, for example, in the SAP of Granada of
10/11/2006 (ROJ: SAP GR 2008/2006), and in the
SAP of Alicante of 27 November 2007 (ROJ: A
2931/2007).
12 ARP 1999/4239, consulted on the Aranzadi
Westlaw Database.
13 This class of criminal offence appeared in the
second half of the 1980s as a consequence of the
proliferation of automatic cash dispensers by
banking entities. Enrique Bacigalupo Zapater,
‘Utilización Abusiva de Cajeros automáticos por
terceros no autorizados’ in Poder Judicial, Número
Especial IX: Nuevas formas de delincuencia, 85 and
following; A.M. Javato Martín, ‘Análisis de la
Jurisprudencia Penal en Materia de Medios
Electrónicos de Pago’, in Los medios electrónicos
de pago. Problemas jurídicos (Ricardo Manuel
Mata y Martín and Antonio María Javato Martín),
Comares, Granada, 2007, 375.
14 The crime of burglary (articles 237 and following of
the CP) consists in the misappropriation of goods
using methods assessed as housebreaking or
breaking and entering, which includes the use of
false keys.
15 On all these, STS of 22 January 2004, nº35/2004
(Supreme Court Sentence 22nd of January, 2004),
EDJ 2004/8295 that rectifies the criteria of the
Provincial Court of Madrid that in judgements that
led to convictions for theft and not burglary due to
it not having taken into account that the cash
dispenser from which the money was withdrawn
was situated in a booth which would have been
opened, or that it would have been necessary to
open a door or gate with the magnetic stripe.
16 For further detail on this problem, see Ricardo M.
Mata y Martín, Los delitos de estafa convencional,
estafa informática y robo en el ámbito de los
medios electrónicos de pago. El uso fraudulento de
tarjetas y otros instrumentos de pago. (Aranzadi
2007), 142 and following.
assistants, he used it to make purchases, which were
subsequently charged to the card holder’s account. The
TS upholds the similar nature of the offence described
in article 248-2 as:
quien aparenta ser titular de una tarjeta de crédito (…)
y actúa en connivencia con quien introduce los datos
en una máquina posibilitando que ésta actúe
mecánicamente está empleando un artificio para
aparecer como su titular ante el terminal bancario a
quien suministra los datos requeridos para la
obtención de fondos de forma no consentida por el
perjudicado.
whosoever appears to be the holder of a card (...) and
acts in collusion with whoever inputs the data into the
machine, thereby making it possible for it to work
automatically is using an artifice so as to register as
the owner of the bank card at the bank terminal by
inputting the owner’s data to obtain funds without the
consent of the party incurring the loss.11
At other times, that the offender creates a fictitious
commercial entity by requesting a Point-of-Sale (POS)
terminal with which to commit the fraud. Thus, in the
trial leading to the Judgment of the Provincial Court of
Valencia of 2-11-199912 (num. 4/1999), various
individuals by mutual accord considered installing a
POS terminal for a fictitious business, and by making
use of the terminal and credit cards stolen from their
owners (which they possessed in great number), made
fictitious transactions, thus obtaining the money from
the transactions. The Provincial court appreciated the
existence of a continuing offence of electronic fraud and
the continuing offence of the falsification of commercial
documents.
The use of credit cards in ATMs by thieves
There is yet another area in which the fraudulent use of
bank cards takes place: at ATMs owned by banks that
enable people to us the facilities offered at any hour of
the day. These systems have also prompted the illicit
use of bank cards, usually to obtain quantities of cash
from cash dispensers. The emergence of such new
attacks13 lacked specific provisions in relation to the
offence set out in the Penal Code. However, the
response from the judges was to analyse the offence in
relation to the physical layout of the ATMs. To begin
with, the cash dispensers were placed in an enclosed
space that required the same bank card to gain entry.
This led the courts to define the offence as burglary
using false keys.14
With the approval of the Penal Code of 1995, the
legislator understood that the solution proposed by the
courts made it possible to consider a card as a false key,
and amended the definition of false keys with the
inclusion of a final paragraph which sought to establish
a comparison between a magnetic stripe and false keys:
A los efectos del presente artículo, se consideran
llaves las tarjetas, magnéticas o perforadas y los
mandos o instrumentos de apertura a distancia.
For the purposes of the present article, both cards,
whether magnetic or perforated, and remote control
opening devices or instruments are considered keys
(article 239 in fine).
This treatment constitutes consolidated case-law;15
although the reservations expressed in legal doctrine
are not, it appears, altogether dismissed by the
amendment to the legislation. In these cases, the
application of the specific provision in the final
paragraph of article 239 has normally led to charges of
‘robo con fuerza (burglary)’ in criminal proceedings,
without entering into some of the more debateable
points that might complicate an appraisal of the actual
offence of burglary or housebreaking.16
On this point, it is worth pointing out that the
provision clearly states that it is to be considered ‘for
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the purposes of the present article’, that is, in the case
of burglary using false keys, which means it is
necessary to provide all of their general features,
specifically that force must be used ‘para acceder al
lugar donde éstas se encuentran (to gain entry to the
place where these are found)’ (article 237). The
provision in question refers to devices or instruments
for remote ‘opening’, which brings us back to the
specific context of burglary, which could also be applied
to this category of offence. Furthermore, the keys in the
Spanish Penal Code are considered false when they are
used to open a lock in the normal way in order to allow
entry into an enclosed space. However, the cards used
in cash dispensers do not have to have previously
facilitated access to an enclosed space, and in addition,
they involve other aspects that go beyond the definition
in the Code of a false key as being merely an opening
device.
In reality, the very nature of this type of offence
relates to a fraudulent act, to which the conventional
offence of fraud as defined under Spanish law does not
apply, because of the absence of personal deceit that is
required by legal doctrine and judicial precedent. In
addition, beyond any possible use as an opening
device, the purpose of the card is, naturally, to be used
in the exercise of a right to credit or to withdraw funds
through the financial entity – based on the pre-existing
legal contract between the card holder and the issuing
entity – which by using the PIN, the issuer obtains
sufficient evidence to assure itself that the legitimate
holder of the card wishes to initiate a transaction in the
ATM.
Judgment of the TS of 9 May 2007
Showing some sensitivity to the reasoning set out
above, the recent judgment of the TS of 9 May 2007
moves away from what is accepted as consolidated
jurisprudence and considers it possible to include the
improper use of bank cards at automatic cash
dispensers within the definition of computer fraud as
defined in article 248.2.17
The factual circumstances to which the judgment
refers concerned a group that was dedicated to copying
credit cards and to making fraudulent use of them for
the purposes of personal profit. To do so, they used a
procedure known as ‘skimming’ consisting of the
substitution of a magnetic band on an original or new
credit or debit card for data on an existing one which
they surreptitiously obtained by means of card readers.
Having created forged cards, they used these in
commercial establishments – presenting forged
documents to identify themselves as the owners of the
cards, and to withdraw money from the bank account of
the customers whose data they had stolen.
They also used the procedure known as ‘la siembra
(sowing)’, which consists in obtaining the victim’s PIN
number and credit card by placing somebody at a
suitable distance from a card holder at a cash dispenser
to observe the PIN, and to distract him in such a way
that he loses sight of the card when it is returned by the
machine, by which time it is removed and replaced by
another card. The victim does not notice the switched
bank card until he uses it to carry out further
operations. The bank cards obtained in this way are
used to withdraw money from cash dispensers; when
these became invalid because they have reached the
preset maximum withdrawal limit, they are used as a
resource to manufacture other cards with which to carry
out further operations.18
A number of criticisms have been made by legal
commentators on the inclusion of these circumstances
within the offence of burglary (absence of access into an
enclosed space, lack of consent to hand over the
goods), yet the judgment upholds the definition of the
facts as elements of computer fraud. The Spanish High
Court have established that the offender, by inputting
the PIN or secret number of the stolen card into an ATM,
is dishonestly identifying himself to the bank as the
rightful owner of the card, thereby prompting the bank
to transfer an amount of money voluntarily. Such an
identification
… ha de ser considerada bajo la conducta de
manipulación informática a que se refiere el tipo de la
estafa del art. 248.2 CP
… has to be considered as behaviour that amounts to
manipulation of computer data to which the category
of fraud defined under art. 248.2 Penal Code refers.
This interpretation is supported, in the words of the
Spanish High Court, by the Council Framework Decision
17 Note that is the sole judgment of the TS
pronounced in this direction. Formerly, some
decisions by the High Court (STS 185/2006)
pronounced in favour of the solution of computer
fraud although in a hypothetical or merely
dialectical manner, as the category of crime in
article 248.2 of the Penal Code has not been the
subject of the accusation.
18 For more descriptions of similar attacks, together
with additional case law from across the world, see
Stephen Mason, editor, Electronic Evidence:
Disclosure, Discovery & Admissibility (LexisNexis
Butterworths, 2007), 4.04-4.15.
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The courts have begun to move away from the criteria
they initially upheld, and begun to punish such conduct
as counterfeiting of legal tender.
19 2001/413/JHA: Council Framework Decision of 28
May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of
non-cash means of payment OJ L149, 2.6.2001, p.
1–4.
20 Emilio Manuel Fernández García and Juana López
Moreno, ‘La utilización…’, in Cuadernos de
Derecho Judicial VI-2002, 81.
of 28 May 2001 combating fraud and counterfeiting of
non-cash means of payment,19 because article 3, relating
to offences and computers, covers the following:
Each Member State shall take the necessary
measures to ensure that the following conduct is a
criminal offence when committed intentionally:
performing or causing a transfer of money or
monetary value and thereby causing an unauthorised
loss of property for another person, with the intention
of procuring an unauthorised economic benefit for the
person committing the offence or for a third party, by:
- without right introducing, altering, deleting or
suppressing computer data, in particular identification
data, or
- without right interfering with the functioning of a
computer programme or system.
The defining characteristics of data manipulation as
provided for in article 3 includes identification by means
of a secret number or PIN.
Counterfeiting and the alteration of cards 
The treatment of counterfeiting and the alteration of
cards in case law has varied over time. In the Penal Code
of 1973, and in the absence of specific regulation, bank
cards were accorded the status of a mercantile
document. As a consequence, the creation of a cloned
card by forgery and the manipulation of legitimate cards
were subsumed under the articles dedicated to this type
of counterfeiting, as determined by the Supreme Court
in its judgment of 3 December 1991.20
Greater difficulties were involved in the assessment,
alteration or manipulation of the magnetic stripe on the
card, as the element that it incorporates is difficult to
equate with the concept of a document. The problem
was corrected in the Penal Code of 1995, which provides
an extensive and broad concept of a document under
article 26 that now covers magnetic stripes on cards.
However, the specific consideration of credit and debit
cards as money in article 387 of the New Penal Code will
raise questions over such an approach to the problem in
case law. The courts have begun to move away from the
criteria they initially upheld, and begun to punish such
conduct as counterfeiting of legal tender. An especially
controversial point is the alteration of the magnetic
stripe, as the Penal Code of 1995 decriminalised the
conduct previously defined as alteration of legal tender,
such that the card that has been manipulated can only
be compared in a rather laboured way to the category of
offence in article 386-1, which is the manufacture of
money, understood as the creation of new money by
counterfeiting legal tender.
The Supreme Court has put an end to debate on the
question through the Acuerdo del Pleno no
Jurisdiccional de la Sala Segunda (Agreement of the
Non-Jurisdictional Full Court Session of the Second
Chamber) issued on 28-6-2002. It opted to subsume
alterations to the magnetic stripes of an authentic card
under the offence of counterfeiting, putting forward the
following argument:
… las tarjetas de crédito o débito son medios de pago
que tienen la consideración de ‘dinero de plastic’, que
el artículo 387 del Código penal equipara a la
moneda, por lo que la incorporación a la ‘banda
magnética’ de uno de estos instrumentos de pago, de
unos datos obtenidos fraudulentamente, constituye
un proceso de fabricación o elaboración que debe ser
incardinado en el art. 386 del Código penal.
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… credit and debit cards are means of payment that
are considered ‘plastic money’, which article 387 of
the Penal Code equates with money, such that the
incorporation of data obtained in a fraudulent manner
on the ‘magnetic stripe’ of one of these instruments of
payment constitutes a process of production or
preparation that should included under art 386 of the
Penal Code.
This view was later be confirmed by a Judgement of the
Supreme Court num. 948/2002 (Criminal Chamber) of
8th July,21 in which the Supreme Court proceeded to
differentiate between the behaviour in question and
computer fraud. The reform of Organic Law 15/2003 has
endorsed the criteria of the Spanish Supreme Court, by
reintroducing the alteration of legal tender as a form of
criminal offence in article 386 of the Penal Code.
Likewise, the judicial interpretation of the concept of
money was also extended to ‘las demás tarjetas que
puedan utilizarse como medios de pago (the other cards
that may be used as means of payment)’ (cash card and
such like).
The classification of falsifying electronic bank cards as
a crime of counterfeiting legal tender is open to criticism
from two points of view. First, from the point of view of
punishment, a very harsh sentence in the case of
counterfeiting legal tender (a prison term of between 8
to 12 years, article 386 Penal Code) would be applied to
circumstances that are much less serious, such as
forgery of an isolated card or the mere possession of a
forged card to use it as an instrument of payment.
Second, from the point of view of authorization by virtue
of article 65. b. LOPJ, the competency to judge these
facts falls on the Audiencia Nacional (National Court)
with a specialized jurisdiction covering terrorism and
organized crime, which appears to be questionable.22
Hence, the Supreme Court has subsequently modified
its general doctrine in the AATS of 18 February 200423
and 21 April 2004,24 insofar as it identifies two types of
circumstances:
a. The forgery of the card (alteration or manipulation
of its magnetic stripe) and possessing forged credit
cards for making purchases or distribution
constitute counterfeiting of money and the
competent court is therefore the Audiencia Nacional
(High Court).
b.Mere possession of one or various forged cards for
their use as an instrument of payment are
subsumed under the offence of falsification of
mercantile documents and thus do not amount to
the counterfeiting of money that comes under the
jurisdiction of the Audiencia Nacional.
The European Community perspective 
There is an interest in a more effective assurance of
security for the means of payment that may clearly be
seen in the international context, especially respecting
electronic payments. In this respect there are two areas
of action of great importance for criminal regulation, the
Cybercrime Convention of 2001 and various actions of
the European Union.
The Convention on Cybercrime, drawn up in Budapest
in 2001, deals with the complex problem of computer
crime in the international context. Among its proposed
measures, it includes the harmonization of punishable
acts linked to computing that should be the subject of
criminal offences in the signatory countries. The
Convention establishes various groups of infractions
that should be incorporated into national legislation and
which it classifies into four broad categories of illicit
offences. Among these, in a second group of
behaviours, the Convention refers to computer crimes,
which include computer-related forgery and computer-
related fraud. Computer fraud (article 8) refers to the
input, alteration, deletion, or suppression of computer
data or any interference with the functioning of a
computer system, with a view to procuring an economic
benefit for oneself or for another person.
Furthermore, especially from European Union
institutions, the importance of payment systems has
been highlighted, which have a bearing on the criminal
legislation of the Member States. In reality, the
perspectives of the European Union are not strictly
penal, but aim to guarantee and to stimulate economic
activity, consumer protection and, to some extent, to
prevent and deal with organized crime. However,
through certain community measures that have an
effect on domestic criminal legislation, it proposes the
criminalization of certain conduct and other measures
with the aim of protecting this means of payment. Thus,
21 Nº 948/2002 in Actualidad Penal. Nº45. 2 al 8 de
diciembre de 2002, p. 3141 and following.
22 Carolina Villacampa Estiarte, ‘La falsificación de
medios de pago distintos del efectivo en el
Proyecto de Ley Orgánica de Reforma del CP de
2007: ¿respetamos las demandas armonizadoras
de la Unión Europea?’, in Diario La Ley, nº 6994, 22
of July, 2008, 3 and following.
23 Id Cendoj: 28079120012004200356.
24 Id Cendoj: 28079120012004200586. See also on
this point ATS 10-3-2004, Id Cendoj:
28079120012004200420; of 1-4-2004, Id Cendoj:
28079120012004200545, of 7-12-2004 Id Cendoj:
28079120012004202326.
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25 On this matter, see Lafuente Sánchez, R. Los
servicios financieros bancarios electrónicos, (Tirant
lo Blanch 2005), 337, and Francesco Buffa,
“Moneta digitale e tutele”. Commercio elettronico
e tutela del consumatore a cura di Giuseppe
Cassano (Giuffré 2003), 178 and following.
26 Lafuente Sánchez, R., Los servicios financieros
bancarios electrónicos (Tirant lo Blanch 2005),
337.
the European Union has not ceased to show concern
and to adopt measures to prevent illicit acts with what it
refers to as ‘non-cash means of payment’.25
In view of the importance that is given to electronic
commerce for the future economic development of the
zone, various initiatives have been taken, each having a
greater degree of definition and penetration. Thus, the
Commission, on 16th April 1997, in a Communication to
the European Parliament, the Council, the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions ‘A
European Initiative in Electronic Commerce’
COM(97)157, proposed that certain actions be defined
and set in motion aiming to maximise the advantages of
the new technology involved in electronic commerce.
The Council also invited Member States to set up
awareness-raising campaigns and training on practical
improvements, and to create transparent consultation
mechanisms with the aim of drawing up the legal
framework and the specific actions for the promotion of
this type of commerce. Finally, it called on European
regulatory bodies to draw up more efficient working
methods with a view to ensuring interoperability and to
respond to consumer needs.
Subsequently the Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament, to the Council,
to the Central European Bank and to the Economic and
Social Committee on ‘A Framework for action on
combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means
of payment’ was approved. The Communication
approved by the Commission, on 1st July (COM
(1998)395) is in response to the proposal from the
Council of Europe on June 1997, in which the
Commission examined the question of fraud and
counterfeiting in relation to all non-cash means of
payment, including electronic payments, which means it
will encompass facts relating to conventional criminal
activity and facts relating to the use of the new
technologies.26 The Communication proposes a two-
pronged plan in the strategy to prevent and deal with
fraud.
The first point is a Joint Plan of Action directed, on the
one hand, at ensuring that frauds referring to all non-
cash means of payment are categorised as criminal
offences and made punishable through effective,
proportionate and dissuasive sentences in all Member
States and, on the other hand, at setting up appropriate
mechanisms for cooperation that will enable the
effective prosecution of the crimes. To that effect,
classes of behaviour are described which are considered
advisable to classify as criminal offences, whatever the
means of payment might be. The following in particular
are included among the offences listed: theft or the
forgery of a means of payment, the possession of
altered or counterfeited means of payment, the use or
acceptance of a payment in full knowledge of the facts
with the aid of a forged or stolen means of payment.
The second point of the action plan against fraud
presents various preventive measures to be studied by
all interested parties (payment card schemes, issuers,
card users, and competent authorities). Thus, from the
standpoint of prevention, it is thought that one of the
Communication’s objectives is to urge operators to
adopt more effective protection measures for the
payment instruments that they manufacture.
The concern of Community institutions for the success
of the information society, as a prerequisite for growth,
competitiveness and employment opportunities, is
expressed in the Communication from the Commission
on Creating a Safer Information Society by Improving
the Security of Information Infrastructures and
Combating Computer-related Crime-COM(2000) 890
FINAL. The Communication considers different initiatives
with respect to a wide range of objectives that comprise
part of the Information Society, which aim to improve
information infrastructures as a way of preventing and
dealing with computer crime. In reference to the Lisbon
summit of March 2000, it underlines the importance of a
transition to a competitive, dynamic, knowledge-based
economy as well as to the centrality of information
infrastructures in present-day economic life, on which
society increasingly depends, while noting, at the same
time, that these technologies may be used to commit
and to facilitate criminal activities. Security measures
must focus on adapting to these new forms of
criminality.
This makes the ever-greater proximity of computer
crime to the new categories of organized crime very
clear. Associated criminality increasingly involves a
greater number of offences among which computer
fraud is increasingly apparent. The community
institutions stated as much at the Tampere Summit, in
October 1999, at which high-Tech crime was included in
a list of areas in which a special effort had to be made
to agree on definitions, types of offences and common
sanctions. All these points are contained in
recommendation 7 of the strategy of the European
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Union for the new millennium on prevention and control
of organized crime, adopted by the JHA Council in March
2000.
An important impetus was given with the approval by
the Commission of a Framework Decision in matters
concerning non-cash means of payments. Indeed, the
Framework Decision, together with other instruments of
the European Union, will be greatly heeded in the
reform of the Penal Code proposed in the Draft Law of
2006. In accordance with the provisions of article 34 of
the Treaty on European Union (the former article K.6),
the proposal was to replace the joint action proposed by
the Commission in its Communication of 1 July 1998, on
combating fraud and counterfeiting of non-cash means
of payment with a Framework Decision. Equally, the
Proposal for a Framework Decision also had as its aim
the inclusion of legislative changes that have been
enacted since the approval of the Communication. Thus
the Council Framework Decision of 28 May 2001,
relating to the fight against fraud and the counterfeiting
of non-cash means of payment, is intended to complete
a series of measures already adopted by the Council
with the same aim. For the purposes of the Framework
Decision, means of payment are considered to be all
corporeal instruments except for legal tender, the
specific nature of which is to allow, by itself or with
another instrument, the holder or user to transfer
money or a monetary value, and which is protected
against counterfeiting or fraudulent use. This
description precludes not only money in cash
(banknotes and legal tender) but also electronic money
in its strictest sense that has no material presence.
The objective of the Framework Decision continues to
be that of ensuring, on the one hand, that all fraud with
non-cash means of payment becomes an offence
subject to effective penalties in all Member States and,
on the other hand, that mechanisms are created for
cooperation between Member States and between
services and public or private bodies with the objective
of successfully prosecuting such offences. In the
Framework Decision, any fraud involving a non-cash
means of payment is considered a criminal offence
punishable by effective, proportionate and dissuasive
sentences throughout the Member States of the Union.
With respect to the criminal conduct, the approach of
the Framework Decision is to avoid resorting to
categorical definitions already strictly defined in the
criminal law of the Member States, because it varies by
country. Thus, the Framework Decision limits itself to
drawing up a list of different intentional behaviours that
should be considered criminal offences throughout the
Union. Different behaviours are defined according to
whether they are primarily concerned with the actual
instrument of payment or the counterfeiting of
instruments of payment, and whether it is a question of
one or more payments or of the clearing system used to
execute, collect, process, or settle payment
transactions. Thus, it includes:27
a.theft or misappropriation of an instrument of
payment,
b.the alteration or counterfeiting of an instrument of
payment with a view to its fraudulent use,
c. receiving, obtaining or transporting, sale or transfer
to another person or possession of instruments of
payment that have been misappropriated or altered
or counterfeited for fraudulent use, and
d.fraudulent use of a means of payment that has been
stolen, misappropriated, altered or counterfeited.
Offences that will also be subject to prosecution are
those using computers to make or cause a transfer of
money or monetary values that lead to unauthorized
loss of property, with the intention of procuring
economic benefit through the unauthorized inputting,
alteration, suppression or deletion of computer data –
especially personal data, or unauthorized interference in
the operation of a computer system or programme.
Other criminal offences include the manufacture, receipt
or transfer of computer programs and other devices
prepared for the commission of the former offences.
With respect to the nature of the penalties to be
adopted in this field, it is envisaged that the list of
conducts be categorised as criminal offences
throughout the Member States. As a consequence,
Member States should establish criminal penalties for
these offences, according to whether they are
committed by natural or by legal persons. The
expression that is so well liked in EU documents
reiterates that the penalties must be effective,
proportionate and dissuasive. They will not necessarily
imply prison terms, except for the most serious cases
for which extradition can be justified. The Member
States enjoy a certain leeway when defining the
seriousness of an offence and the nature and severity of
27 Francesco Buffa, ‘Moneta digitale e tutele’ in
Commercio elettronico e tutela del consumatore
(Editor Giuseppe Cassano) (Giuffré 2003), 179-80.
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28 For an incomplete treatment of how some Member
States have implemented the various EU Directives
(that nevertheless runs to over 450 pages), see a
paper by Stephen Mason, ‘The implementation of
Community regulations in national legislation: IT
offences in the strict sense of the word and
offences committed using IT’, prepared for a
judicial seminar entitled: Investigation,
Prosecution and Judgment of Information
Technology Crime: Legal framework and criminal
policy in the European Union, held for judges and
public prosecutors specializing in dealing with
cybercrime, organized within the framework of the
European Judicial Training Network, (Tuesday 25
November 2008 to Friday 28 November 2008 at the
Hôtel Jean de Bohême, Durbuy, Belgium), and
available as a free download from
http://www.stephenmason.eu/training-for-
lawyers/judicial-training/.
29 Communication from the Commission to the
Council, the European Parliament, the European
Economic and Social Committee, the European
Central Bank and Europol - A new EU Action Plan
2004-2007 to prevent fraud on non-cash means of
payment {SEC(2004) 1264} (Text with EEA
relevance)/* COM/2004/0679 final */.
30 http://www.congreso.es.
the applicable penalties.28
Finally, as the work of the Commission on these
means of payment has continued, a further
Communication was issued from the Commission.29 The
Commission considers that cooperation between all the
agencies involved is a fundamental principle in order to
prevent and deal with fraud in an effective manner. In
fact, greater cooperation is desirable between public
authorities and the private sector in the Member States.
With the aim of ensuring an effective exchange of
information at a European level, the Commission stated
that clarification of community and national legislation
in the field of data protection is needed in the area of
fraud prevention.
The draft reform of the Penal Code
The economic significance of payment systems and the
high volume of fraud drew the attention of the legislator
to this field, and particularly the attention of the
criminal legislator. Hence, the Draft Law to reform the
Penal Code of 15 December, 2006,30 is intended to
amend criminal regulation of these matters. It sought to
add a specific element to the field of frauds under
article 248: the use of bank cards or related data. The
draft law fell into abeyance as the legislative term came
to an end, but parts of it may be found in the
programme of criminal measures for the present
legislature, and in any case, it points to the way in
which possible criminal reforms may be introduced in
this field.
In a general way, the Explanatory Memorandum of the
draft law goes a long way to justifying its proposals on
the basis of the commitments and obligations that
European integration implies for the criminal justice
system. Among the areas subject to community
harmonisation is that of the means of payment, which
lies behind the new regulation. The Explanatory
Memorandum of the project points out that:
La causa central que explica su acotado alcance ha de
ser buscada fundamentalmente en los compromisos y
obligaciones que la integración europea suponen
para la justicia penal en toda su dimensión penal,
procesal, judicial y policial. La importante vertiente
del derecho penal ha venido recogiendo al paso de su
aparición cuantas orientaciones comunes, plasmadas
en los diferentes instrumentos jurídicos de la Unión
Europea, determinaban modificaciones u adiciones al
Código penal, y eso explica buena parte de las
alteraciones del Código. Pero además, en los últimos
años, especialmente a partir del Tratado de
Ámsterdam en 1997, el llamado Tercer Pilar fortaleció
la importancia de hacer efectiva la cooperación
policial y judicial en materia penal, lo cual exigía
necesariamente la armonización o aproximación de
las leyes estatales en materia penal, y por esa razón
se han ido produciendo Decisiones marco sobre un
amplio catálogo de problemas penales, Decisiones
que empujan a una necesaria similitud de las
formulaciones de delitos y responsabilidades en los
derechos internos.
The central reason that explains its highly defined
scope is to be found in the commitments and
obligations entailed by European integration for
criminal justice in all of its dimensions, be they
criminal, procedural, judicial or police related. This
important vector of criminal law has brought together
many common perspectives since its emergence,
expressed in the different legal instruments of the
European Union, which determined modifications and
additions to the Penal Code, and these explain a good
part of the amendments to the Code. But in addition,
in recent years, especially since the Treaty of
Amsterdam in 1997, the so-called Third Pillar
strengthened the importance of ensuring effective
police and judicial cooperation in criminal matters,
which necessarily required the harmonisation or
approximation of State laws on criminal matters, and
for that reason Framework Decisions have been
drafted in response to a wide range of criminal
problems, Decisions that work towards a much-
needed similarity in the formulation of offences and
liabilities in domestic rights.
Committing fraud through the use of misappropriated
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